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RESOLVING TREATY CONFLICTS
CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN*
INTRODUCTION
Should the rules of the World Trade Organization trump inter-
national environmental agreements? How are treaties between the
United States and its European partners affected by the construc-
tion of the European Union? What can be done to avert conflict
among Russia, Iran, and certain central Asian states over the con-
trol of the oil beneath the Caspian Sea? Although seemingly dispa-
rate topics, all of these dilemmas are, in part, disputes over
whether certain treaties should be given preference over other
treaties. These conflicts are fueled by many different political and
economic concerns. Regardless of the source of concern, however,
as a matter of international law, the question remains the same: Is
there a principled method by which sovereign states in the interna-
tional system can resolve conflicting obligations between treaties?
Due to treaty proliferation in recent years, this question is more
important than ever.
The viability of international law, as a legal system, rests largely
on the viability of treaties as a source of law. In the second half of
the twentieth century, the international state system was supported
by the development of treaties.' States focused the majority of
their regime-building efforts on three sets of concerns: restraining
interstate conflict, securing human rights, and managing the eco-
nomic system. States used treaties as the primary tool in the con-
struction of these international institutions and in the codification
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to
thank John Barrett, Charles Biblowit, Lori Outzs Borgen, Elaine Chiu, Greg Fox, Paul
Kirgis, Peggy Kniffin, Mike Mattler, Peggy McGuinness, Michael Perino, Brian Tamanaha,
Robert Vischer, Nick Weiskopf, Timothy Zick, and the editors of the George Washington
International Law Review for their helpful comments and suggestions. This article also
benefited from the research assistance of Anna Mott. Any mistakes are solely my own.
1. While other sources of law such as customary international law are no less juridi-
cally important than treaties, treaties occupy a place of privilege in any discussion of the
state of international law. For example, the TREATY HANDBOOK, published by the United
Nations (UN), states that "[t]reaties are the primary source of international law." UNITED
NATIONS, U.N. TREATY HANDBOOK, Foreword (n.d.), http://untreaty.un.org/English/
TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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of these norms.2 Moreover, treaties shift issues from the political
arena into a juridical, rule-based, forum. As of 2005, there were
approximately 50,000 treaties on file in the U.N. Treaty System. 3
The very success of treaties as a policy tool has caused a new
dilemma: a surfeit of treaties that often overlap and, with increas-
ing frequency, conflict with one another. For the treaty partners of
states that have adopted conflicting treaties, this results in a lack of
certainty as to which-if either-treaty would be honored. 4 After
the successes of the last fifty years, international law may become
increasingly dysfunctional in the first decades of the twenty-first
century due to the sheer number of these treaties and the lack of
useful, principled, methods to resolve conflicts between them.
The International Law Commission (ILC) has turned its atten-
tion to the problem of treaty conflicts and the potential fragmenta-
tion of international law more broadly with the organization of the
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law (Fragmenta-
tion Study Group) in 2002. 5 The Fragmentation Study Group will
consider fragmentation as a consequence of the expansion and
diversification of international law.6 Its initial view is that while
fragmentation in and of itself is not new, it is increasing. 7 This
increase in fragmentation underlies recent concerns about friction
between trade law, on one side, and environmental law and human
rights law, on the other,8 as well as the overlapping and competing
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Introductory Note (1987) ("The law of international
agreements has increased in significance and scope since the Second World War, as inter-
national agreements have assumed a larger place in the life of the international commu-
nity of states and in international law.").
3. See generally UNITED NATIONS, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION: ACCESS TO DATABASES, at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
4. See Thomas M. Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Crite-
rion for Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. REv. 1101, 1101 (1959-1960) ("Disorder, as it is
known to a lawyer, is perhaps less frequently an absence of legal order, than a surfeit of
it[."); see also David Kennedy, Tom Franck and the Manhattan School, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 397, 397 (2003).
5. The Sixth Conmittee of the General Assembly (which deals with legal affairs)
supported the International Law Commission's (ILC) recommendation for a broad study
dealing with treaty conflicts, and that such a study should be oriented on the guide pro-
vided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.644
(2003). The goal of the Group is to fashion a toolbox for responding to fragmentation.
6. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.628 (2002).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., JoosT PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NoRms IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
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jurisdictions of international tribunals,9 and the general coherence
of the international legal system.
This Article addresses a particular cause of fragmentation-
unresolved conflicts between treaties-and considers how lawyers
and policymakers may respond to the challenges posed by treaty
proliferation and conflict. I argue that treaty conflicts are a key
underlying cause of fragmentation and that the current rules are
inadequate to provide clear, systematic solutions to treaty conflicts.
An initial problem is that there is no generally accepted defini-
tion of what constitutes a conflict between treaties.10 A conflict in
the strict sense occurs when a party to two treaties cannot simulta-
neously honor its obligations under both. A divergence between
treaties, however, need not always be a conflict.11 Consider the fol-
lowing: State A forms a treaty (Treaty I) with State B promising that
B will have access to A's markets at terms no worse than any other
state. Some years later, State A becomes part of a regional eco-
nomic treaty with States C, D, E, and F. This second treaty (Treaty
II) requires that member states accord each other, and only each
other, the best terms of market access. B insists that A is required by
Treaty I to give B the same terms as C, D, E, and F. Those states
argue that A is required by Treaty II to deny B the terms of trade
that they receive under Treaty II. Using this narrow definition of
what constitutes a conflict between treaties, however, is too restric-
tive. 12 States are not only concerned with when it is impossible for
a state to abide by two treaties, but also when one treaty frustrates
the goals of another. Thus, treaty conflicts can be conceived more
broadly as when a state is party to two or more treaty regimes and
either the mere existence of, or the actual performance under, one
treaty will frustrate the purpose of another treaty. Under either
9. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International
Tribunals?, 271 RECUIEL DES COURS 101 (1998) [hereinafter Charney, Is International Law
Threatened] Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of
International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 697 (1999) [Charney,
Impact]; YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (2003).
10. PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 166 ("The definition of when two norms of interna-
tional law are in 'conflict' has, surprisingly, attracted little attention. Most authors writing
on the topic of interplay or hierarchy of norms do not even provide a definition.").
11. C. WilfredJenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401, 426
(1953) [hereinafter Jenks, Law-Making Treaties]; see also PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 167.
12. Other ILC Rapporteurs argued for broader definitions. Hersch Lauterpacht
focused on "inconsistency" of norms, and Humphrey Waldock on the idea that conflict
occurred when two treaties could not be reconciled. See PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 168.
For information concerning ILC Rapporteurs on the law of treaties, see infra Part III.A and
accompanying discussion.
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this definition or the stricter construction, the questions for the
policymaker are the same: Which treaty should prevail? Are there
any useful, principled methods to resolve this conflict?
I use the phrase "useful, principled methods" deliberately. I do
not claim that there are no principled methods of resolving treaty
conflicts; rather, we have many that are rarely used. I do not claim
that there are no useful methods for resolving treaties; instead, the
methods currently employed have been somewhat effective but
have little or nothing to do with legal principle and much to do
with power and politics. Thus, the goals of many states involved in
treaty-making-decreasing the politicization of international rela-
tions and increasing rule-based decision making and conflict reso-
lution-are actually undercut by their own efforts because treaty
congestion leads to political bargaining, not principled action.
The method of resolving treaty conflicts is ostensibly found in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 13 Com-
pleted in 1969 and effective as ofJanuary 27, 1980, the VCLT is the
"treaty on treaties," setting forth canons of treaty interpretation,
general rules governing how treaties operate, and means of avoid-
ing or resolving potential disputes. 14 Article 30 of the VCLT
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. Article 30, entitled
Application of Successive Treaties Relating to the Same Subject-Matter, states:
1. The Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States and
international organizations parties to successive treaties relating to the same
subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the following
paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered asincompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty
prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but
the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59,
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible
with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier
one:
(a) as between 2 parties each of which is a party to both treaties, the same rule
applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a party to both treaties and a party to only one of the treaties,
the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and
obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termi-
nation or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any
question of responsibility which may arise for a State or for an international
organization from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of
which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under
another treaty.
14. Although the United States has signed, but has not ratified, the VCLT, parts of it
are treated as "codifying existing international law; United States courts have also treated
particular provisions of the Vienna Convention as authoritative." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
Resolving Treaty Conflicts
addresses conflicts between "successive treaties relating to the same
subject-matter." As Richard D. Kearney and Robert E. Dalton, two
of the U.S. negotiators of the Vienna Convention, wrote in the
American Journal of International Lauw:
In essence [Article 30 of the VCLT] provides that: (a) if a treaty
says it is subject to another treaty, the other treaty governs on
any issue of compatibility; (b) as between parties to one treaty
who become parties to a second, the second governs on any
point where it is incompatible with the first; (c) if some of the
parties to the first treaty are not parties to the second treaty, and
vice versa, the first governs between a party to both and a party
only to the first; the second governs between a party to both and
a party only to the second.
15
Thus, the normative framework of Article 30 applies only in certain
defined instances. Beyond Article 30, disputes are also resolved
through reference to general principles of treaty interpretation
adapted from related areas such as the law of contracts, statutory
interpretation, and state practice in regard to treaties.
The VCLT was drafted before the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), before the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreements, before the burgeoning of the European
Union (E.U.), and before the enactment of most of the over 1300
bilateral investment treaties that now exist among 160 states.
16
Generally, "[m]odern developments have led to an unprecedented
increase in the number of treaties."
1 7
The current issue, in part, is whether the VCLT and these gen-
eral principles address the needs and nuances of modern state
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Intro-
ductory Note (1987).
15. Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
495, 517 (1970).
16. The same year that the VCLT entered into force (and eleven years after its lan-
guage was drafted) the U.N. Secretary-General wrote that "[a]s the body of international
law created by multilateral treaties increases, greater and greater problems arise about pos-
sible conflict between treaties already in force, whether on a world-wide or regional or
otherwise restricted basis, and new proposed instruments." Analytical Review of the Process:
Report of the Secretary-General, para. 49, U.N. Doc. A/35/312 (1980), revised by U.N. Doc. A/
35/312/Corr. 1 (1980). By 1984, another commentator wrote:
As hundreds or thousands of treaties appear every year, the task of coordination
has assumed formidable dimensions. If, as early as 1932, Rousseau described the
task as one of the most urgent problems in the international order and Jenks
again stressed its eminent practical importance in 1953, this is all the more true
today.
Wolfram Karl, Conflicts Between Treaties, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
935, 936 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
17. Rudolf Bernhardt, Treaties, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw,
supra note 16, at 926, 930.
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practice. Do we have the tools and the techniques to continue the
expansion of international law in a manner that allows for both the
effectiveness of individual treaties as well as the stability of the sys-
tem as a whole?
I argue that the VCLT's treaty conflict provisions are neither an
accurate description of current state practice, nor are they adequate
prescriptions for how states should act. Nevertheless, although the
VCLT is significantly flawed in regard to resolution of conflicting
treaties, there exists no better single rule or set of rules as to how to
resolve such conflicts. Rather than relying on the VCLT, therefore,
lawyers and policymakers need to use various tools and adopt new
"standard operating procedures" to address treaty conflicts.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes treaty con-
flicts in terms of the subject-matter and the structure of the trea-
ties. Part II considers techniques of resolving treaty conflicts as
alternatives to application of the VCLT. Strategies include the
drafting of clauses to avoid potential conflicts and the use of inter-
pretive techniques to analyze texts that have already been written.
Part III turns to the codification of conflict resolution rules in the
VCLT and considers their strengths and weaknesses. Part IV analo-
gizes from other types of textual conflicts, such as conflicts between
contracts or between statutes. Part V draws from the previous sec-
tions to suggest options in addressing treaty conflicts, including:
(a) ending the "same subject-matter" rule in assessing whether or
not treaties conflict and in the application of conflict resolution
rules; (b) increasing the use of purposive interpretation to assess
and resolve treaty conflicts; (c) drafting more detailed conflict
avoidance clauses in treaties; and (d) increasing the use of a proce-
dure of assurance to determine the intention of a state that has
ratified conflicting treaties. While there is no single solution to this
complex dilemma, there are ways to minimize some of the
unwanted effects of the proliferation of treaties. Part V also broad-
ens the focus from these specific recommendations and considers
the implications of the preceding discussion on the status of inter-
national law as a coherent legal system.
Responding to treaty conflicts requires more than just a revision
of the relevant provisions of the VCLT; it requires a more rigorous
approach to envisioning how treaties affect one another, a practice
of drafting treaty clauses that takes this interplay into account, and
a more purposive means of interpretation that will better spot
potential treaty conflicts. As dilemmas tend to have more than one
cause, addressing them usually requires more than one technique.
[Vol. 37
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I take my task-and the task of international lawyers concerned
about the efficacy of international law-from the challenge posed
by Wilfred Jenks, former Director-General of the International
Labour Organization, to "encourage [ ] the adoption of procedures
which will minimize the occurrence of such conflict ... [and] to
formulate principles for resolving such conflict when it arises."
18 I
will begin by mapping the new landscape of treaty congestion and
treaty conflict.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF TRAT- CONFLICTS
Although there are many ways to describe how treaties conflict,
two descriptive methods are particularly relevant. The subject-mat-
ter perspective focuses on whether the treaties overlap in terms of
substantive provisions. This perspective contrasts with structural
analysis of treaty conflict, which looks at considerations such as the
number of state parties, which states are parties to each treaty, and
the general function of each treaty. Both the subject-matter per-
spective and structural analysis are needed to respond to the effects
of treaty congestion.
A. The Subject-Matter Perspective
A treaty may be defined as "a consensual agreement between two
or more subjects of international law intended to be and consid-
ered by the parties as binding and containing rules of conduct
under international law for at least one (normally for all) of the
parties." 19 While this is the broad definition of what may be consid-
ered a treaty under international law, the VCLT defines a treaty for
its purposes as "an international agreement concluded between
States in a written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instru-
ments and whatever its particular designation.
'
"
20
By its own terms, therefore, the VCLT does not apply to various
international agreements that one would consider legally binding
and/or "treaties" in the popular sense of the word. For example,
an oral agreement between two countries does not fall under the
purview of the VCLT, nor do agreements between states and mul-
tinational corporations, such as oil concessions. Conflicts involving
agreements not governed by the VCLT would be resolved using
18. Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 405.
19. Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 927.
20. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 2(1)(a).
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general principles of interpretation, discussed below in Part II.
Similarly, agreements between states and international organiza-
tions or among international organizations are not covered by the
VCLT but are the domain of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, which has the same treaty
conflict provisions as the VCLT.21
The VCLT's conflict provisions apply only to successive treaties
with the same subject-matter. This formulation has led to much
debate over whether or not certain treaties are concerned with the
"same subject-matter." For example, NAFTA and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) cover much of the same
subject-matter, although GATT covers many other subjects as well.
Similarly, one can see that the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights essentially cover the same subject-matter as well. While a
case could be made either way, the stronger argument is that these
treaties would meet any reasonable test for "same subject-matter."
Some of the most important potential conflicts arise, however,
when treaties of seemingly different subject-matter overlap either
in effect or in regulatory scope. The most common scenario is that
of "trade linkage," such as where there are conflicts between trade
and environmental treaties or between trade and human rights
treaties.
Analyses focusing solely on overlapping subject-matter are often
driven by a normative concern favoring one regime-the interna-
tional trading system, the web of environmental agreements, and
so forth-over another. Although it is important to consider the
substantive results of treaty conflicts, it is important also to con-
sider underlying structural issues. For example, the trade linkage
scenarios can also be considered as part of a broader set of con-
flicts between liberalizing instruments and regulating instru-
ments. 22 This requires thinking about the form and function of
the treaties and of the international legal system itself, rather than
only reviewing tactical considerations regarding two specific con-
flicting norms.
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.129/15 (1986). As of March 16, 2005, this treaty has not come into force.
22. Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 415. Jenks noted that, at the time of
his writing on treaty conflicts, the field of communications (e.g. radio and telecommunica-
tions) was an area of particularly serious conflicts. Id. at 416.
[Vol. 37
Resolving Treaty Conflicts
B. Treaty Architecture and Conflict
In considering the form and function of treaties in the interna-
tional system, one can describe treaties a number of ways. For
example, treaties may be bilateral-between two parties-or multi-
lateral. While many treaties can generally be described as liberaliz-
ing or regulating, such as the trade versus environment example
above, a more precise examination of treaty norms reveals-as
Pauwelyn describes-that norms in international law have one of
four basic functions: (1) command norms obligating states to do
something; (2) prohibitive norms obligating states not to do some-
thing; (3) exempting norms giving states the right not to do some-
thing; and (4) permissive norms giving states the right to do
something. 23
This characterization is important when comparing the legal
obligations of two competing treaties. Treaties can also be catego-
rized by analogy to domestic agreements, such as "legislative" or
"contractual" treaties. Legislative treaties "lay down rules for the
behaviour of the parties over a period of time in certain subject
areas . . . [whereas contractual] treaties may provide for an
exchange of certain goods or acts."
24
The VCLT does not formally recognize the categorization of
treaties as legislative or contractual. Moreover, there is no formal
hierarchy among treaties, with the possible exception of the U.N.
Charter, which by its terms and the needs of the international com-
munity trumps all conflicting successive treaties.
25
In the absence of a governing hierarchy, therefore, one can
describe treaty conflicts on a systemic basis. as being the conflict of
universal, multilateral, or bilateral regimes with other universal,
multilateral, or bilateral regimes. 26 I differentiate between multi-
lateral treaties and universal treaties not because there is a techni-
cal legal difference between them, but in order to take into
account cases where some multilateral treaties with limited mem-
bership (such as NAFTA or the European Union) may overlap with
23. PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 158-59.
24. Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 929; see also DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS 25 (2001) (discussing "constitutional" versus "contractual" treaties).
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 103; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 323 cmt. b (1987).
26. This typology leads to six possible types of structural conflicts: (1) Universal/Uni-
versal; (2) Universal/Multilateral; (3) Universal/Bilateral; (4) Multilateral/Multilateral;
(5) Multilateral/Bilateral; and (6) Bilateral/Bilateral. For each of these types of conflicts,
it is also necessary to determine whether the treaties relate to the same or different subject-
matter.
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other multilateral treaties that are open to accession by any state
(such as the U.N. Charter or the GATT) 27
Commentators have focused on three broad structural catego-
ries of treaty conflicts: (1) conflicts between bilateral treaties; (2)
the problem of increasing membership; and (3) the problem of
decreasing membership. Conflicts between bilateral treaties occur
when States A and B are parties to Treaty I, States A and C are
parties to Treaty II, and A's obligations to C are incompatible with
A's obligations to B. This can be diagrammed as AB:AC.28
Two examples of conflicts between bilateral and multilateral
treaties are those of increasing membership (AB:ABCD) and
decreasing membership (ABCD:AB). 29 The decreasing member-
ship scenario is of particular interest and is often referred to as the
problem of inter se agreements, or agreements between certain par-
ties of an earlier treaty. The validity of inter se agreements is a vex-
ing problem and will be considered in the discussion of The Oscar
Chinn Case, below at Part II.C.3.
Additionally, one can envision a conflict between multilateral
treaties where there is a partial unity of parties (ABCD:ABEF) and
where the obligations of A and B to E and F are incompatible with
those to C and D.3 0
27. Also note that multilateral treaties may be one-issue treaties, or the constitutive
treaties of regional organizations-such as the European Union (EU) or the Organization
of African Unity. Regional organizations merit special mention as a particular case of
treaty-making because, aside from the original constitutive treaty, regional organizations
can often have a high density of regulatory activity, as in the E.U., or interpretative activity,
as in NAFIFA and the E.U. Generally speaking, states form regional organizations and
assign to them decision-making capabilities to facilitate policy coordination through regu-
larized channels of information sharing and institutionalized fora for policy discussion and
negotiation. Coordination is predicated on the states involved having common areas of
interest that can be used as a basis of ongoing cooperation. Consequently, the set of inter-
state responsibilities tend to be more robust within regional organizations. Additionally,
while the intraorganizational obligations and rights may be coherent, there is an increased
possibility of incoherence or conflict between a state's rights to the other members of its
regional organization, as opposed to its responsibilities to non-member states with which it
is a party to another treaty regime. There is also a related problem concerning directives
from multiple regional organizations. A further form of conflict can thus be hypothesized
specifically in the case of regional organizations: State A is a member of Regional Organiza-
tions I and II; Regional Organization I has promulgated Directive 1; Regional Organiza-
tion II has promulgated Directive 2; both directives are binding on State A and they are
incompatible with one another. Similar scenarios could include Directive 2 being incom-
patible with the constitutive treaty of Regional Organization I, and so forth.
28. See W. Czaplinski & G. Danilenko, Conflict of Norms in International Law, 21 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 24 (1990). The designation of each treaty as Treaty I or II is based on
which treaty was earlier (or later) in time.
29. See Karl, supra note 16, at 936.
30. Id.
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The cases of complete unity of parties (AB:AB) have at times
been dismissed as being of relatively little interest because the issue
of treaty conflict is simply whether the later treaty was meant to
supersede the earlier treaty. Such an analysis ignores the problem
of two treaties that may not be concerned with the same subject,
which nonetheless overlap in a manner such as that one treaty
could frustrate the purpose of the other. Thus, while there may be
no intent to supersede the earlier treaty, the later treaty may none-
theless render it dysfunctional.
The variety of treaty conflicts has led to a number of possible
solutions, including techniques of drafting treaties, the application
of general principles of law and interpretation, and ultimately,
codified rules in the VCLT. While all of these potential solutions
co-exist, their relationship to each other is at times uneasy. Moreo-
ver, in practice very few of these potential solutions are used effec-
tively. I will turn to each of these approaches and assess the theory
of conflict resolution that animates each technique. I will then
compare and contrast this assessment with the ways in which states
do or do not deploy these strategies.
II. PREVENTIVE ACTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In 1917, the international lawyer Quincy Wright summarized
treaty conflict resolution rules as follows:
[W]here the signatories are the same, the later [treaty] rules,
but where the signatories are different the earlier rules, for in
that case one of the signatories of the first treaty, not having
assented to its abrogation, the other signatory was not compe-
tent to abrogate it alone, by the conclusion of a conflicting
treaty with a third state. 3 '
Thirty-five years later, in 1952, Hans Aufricht provided the fol-
lowing basic methods of resolving a conflict: (1) finding that the
later treaty supersedes the earlier; (2) using an express declaration
in the later treaty to repeal the earlier treaty; (3) including a decla-
ration in the later treaty that it is not at variance with the earlier
treaty; (4) including a provision that no conflicting later treaties
may be concluded; and (5) forming an agreement to promulgate
new terms and supersede currently existing treaty obligations.
3 2
31. Quincy Wright, Conflicts Between International Law and Treaties, 11 Amxs. J  INT'L L.
566, 576 (1917) (citations omitted).
32. Hans Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in International Law, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 655,
656-57 (1952).
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While there are some similarities in both descriptions, they are
especially notable for their use of different techniques. Wright
focuses on structural aspects, such as the identities of the parties to
the treaties, while Aufricht is more concerned with the actual sub-
stance of the treaties. Taken together, though, these descriptions
provide a succinct summary of the main alternatives to the VCLT
for treaty conflict resolution. I will turn to these techniques and
doctrines, which were used to resolve treaty conflicts prior to the
codification of the VCLT, in order to understand their doctrinal
outlook and assess their efficacy in actual cases. Based on this anal-
ysis, I will discern the shortcomings the drafters of the VCLT
attempted to address with the codification of the VCLT.
A. Drafting Techniques
The best solution to treaty conflicts is to prevent potential
problems from occurring in the first place. Thoughtful drafting of
treaty provisions is probably the most effective way to avoid or
resolve potential treaty conflicts. 33 A well wrought treaty obviates
the need for other tools; if the treaties are not actually incompati-
ble, then there is no need to resort to the VCLT or general princi-
ples of interpretation. 34 The two basic types of clauses are: (1)
clauses that provide for the priority of the present treaty; and (2)
clauses that provide for the priority of another treaty.35
The first basic type-clauses that provide for the priority of the
present treaty-state that the current treaty will supersede conflict-
ing treaties. Hans Blix and Jirina Emerson catalogued six general
subtypes of such clauses: (1) the present treaty prevails over all
other treaties; (2) the present treaty prevails over all earlier trea-
ties; (3) the present treaty prevails over earlier treaties for parties
to the present treaty; (4) the parties to the present treaty under-
take an obligation not to enter into later treaties inconsistent with
the present one; (5) supplementary agreements are permitted only
if they are compatible with the present treaty; and (6) the parties to
33. See, e.g., Karl, supra note 16, at 936.
34. See id. (stating that "[i]ncompatibility of contents is an essential condition of
conflict").
35. THE TREATY MAKER'S HANDBOOK 210-22 (Hans Blix & Jirina H. Emerson eds.,
1973). Anthony Aust also sets out a typology of different types of conflict avoidance
clauses. Examples include: "The treaty prevails over all other treaties past, and future,"
ANrHoNy AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 174 (2000); "[t]he parties shall not
enter into later inconsistent treaties," id. at 175; "[a]n existing treaty shall not be affected,"
id. at 176; "[f]or parties to it the treaty prevails over earlier treaties," id. at 177;
"[c]ompatible supplementary treaties are permitted," id. at 179.
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the present treaty undertake an obligation to modify existing trea-
ties that they may have with third parties.
3 6
A clause may be written to apply to specific agreements, as in the
case of the Food Aid Convention of 1999, which states in Article
XXVI that "[t] his Convention shall replace the Food Aid Conven-
tion, 1995, as extended, and shall be one of the constituent instru-
ments of the International Grain Agreement, 1995."
37
Clauses prohibiting later conflicting treaties specifically state that
signatories shall not enter into later treaties that would conflict
with the current agreement. Article 8 of the NATO Treaty is an
example of such a clause: "Each Party declares that none of the
international engagements now in force between it and any other
of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of
this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international
engagement in conflict with this treaty."
38
Related to this is the special case of the U.N. Charter, which
"prevails over all other treaties past and future."3 9 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) analyzed U.N. Charter Article 103 in
the Lockerbie Case, where it found that, because a Security Council
Resolution was promulgated under the auspices of the UN and
thus under Article 103, such a resolution trumped any conflicting
treaty including, in this case, the Montreal Convention.
40
The second basic type-clauses providing for the priority of
another treaty-state that one or more treaties should be given pri-
ority over the current treaty. Aust has styled this clause to mean
that "an existing treaty shall not be affected." 41 Blix and Emerson
list four general subtypes of clauses in this category: (1) existing
treaties prevail; (2) existing or future treaties giving greater bene-
fits prevail; (3) present treaty is modified to conform to a future
treaty; and (4) supplementary agreements, not necessarily consis-
tent with the present treaty, are permitted.42
36. THE TREATfy MAKER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 210-17.
37. Food Aid Convention of 1999, Apr. 13, 1999, art. XXVI, 2073 U.N.T.S. 135.
38. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 8, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 248.
39. AusT, supra note 35, at 174.
40. Id. at 175 (citations omitted); Karl, supra note 16, at 939. Article 103 of the U.N.
Charter states that "[i] n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 103.
41. AuST, supra note 35, at 176.
42. THE TRtATvY MAKER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 217-22.
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Article 90 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, provides the following example:
This Convention does not prevail over any international agree-
ment which has already been or may be entered into and which
contains provisions concerning the matters governed by this
Convention, provided that the parties have their places of busi-
ness in States parties, to such agreement. 43
Other phrases typical in such clauses would involve some decla-
ration that the present treaty is "compatible with, or not to be con-
strued as impairing" an earlier treaty.44 This is exemplified by
Article 4(2) of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty, which states that "[n]othing in this Protocol
shall derogate from the other instruments in force within the
Antarctic Treaty system.."45
Clauses providing for the priority of the existing treaty or the
priority of another treaty may both exist within a single text. A
treaty may use a combination of these clauses to provide a compre-
hensive description of its relation to other treaties. Article 311 of
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) plays such
a role, stating:
This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.
This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of
States parties which arise from other agreements compatible
with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by
other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their
obligations under this Convention.
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modify-
ing or suspending the operation of provisions of this Conven-
tion, applicable solely to the relations between them, provided
that such agreements do notfrelate to a provision derogation
from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the
object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further
that such agreements shall not affect the application of the basic
principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such
agreements do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties
of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this
Convention. 46
43. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
art. 90, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1998), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
44. Karl, supra note 16, at 939.
45. Aust, supra note 35, at 177 (quoting Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, S. TREAa-y Doc. No. 102-22, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1463).
46. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 311, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
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If there are no such express provisions of priority within the four
corners of the agreements, or if any such clause is ambiguously
worded, one would turn to principles of treaty interpretation and
the law of treaty conflicts to resolve a dispute.
B. General Principles of Interpretation
Prior to the VCLT, policymakers relied primarily on general
rules of interpretation derived from Roman law and from domestic
canons of statutory or contractual construction.47 Whether any of
these principles has achieved the status of customary international
law is a matter of debate, but regardless, they continue to play an
important role in textual analysis in determining whether treaties
conflict by their terms and, if so, ascertaining the possible resolu-
tions.48 General principles have been used in cases prior to the
enactment of the VCLT and, after the VCLT's entry into force, as a
supplement to its codified norms. While an exhaustive review of
general principles of interpretation is worthy of a book of its own,
for the purposes of this Article, certain norms are of special
interest.
Certain rules of interpretation focus on which treaty is earlier or
later in time. Lex prior, for example, would specifically enforce the
first-or earlier-treaty. This rule is focused on cases where there
is a divergent membership between the two treaties.49
By contrast, lex posterior derogat legi priori (lex posterior) considers
the evolving intent of the parties and favors the most recent treaty
by the same parties. Lex posterior was applied by the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in numerous cases including
the Mavrommatis Concession Cases and the Electricity Company of Sofia
47. The terms "construction" and "interpretation" have been used as different aspects
of analyzing what a statutory or contractual text "means." Although these terms are distin-
guished by some academic authors, I will use them interchangeably here.
48. "General principles" refer to common principles and practices among the major
legal systems of the world. Consequently, researching general principles is generally
viewed as an exercise in comparative law. See Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of "General
Principles"in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. IMr'L L. 279, 282 (1963). But see
Christopher A. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and "Gen-
eral Principles of Law", 5 DuKEJ. COMp. & INr'L L. 35, 66-72 (1994) (critiquing comparativ-
ism as a technique). The goal is not to find a rule that is recognized in all the major
systems of the world, but rather "that in applying [such a 'general principle'] he will not be
doing violence to the fundamental concepts of any of those systems." H.C. GUTRIDGE,
COMPARATIVE LAw 65 (2d ed. 1949). Different authors have differing views of what consti-
tutes the major legal systems of the world, but one will likely need to consider common law
and civil law (with possible subdivisions into those based on the Napoleonic Code or the
German system), as well as Islamic and Chinese systems, and quite possibly others as well.
49. Karl, supra note 16, at 937.
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Case.50 Aufricht's summary of pre-VCLT treaty conflict resolution
techniques focused on lex posterior. In his view, there were five
requirements for lex posterior to work: (1) the later treaty has the
same subject as the earlier treaty; (2) the later treaty covers the
same parties as the earlier treaty; (3) the later treaty is on the same
level or a higher level as the earlier treaty; (4) the scope of the later
treaty is of the same degree of generality as the earlier treaty; and
(5) the legal effect or effects of the later treaty are different from
the earlier.5 1
Andrea Schulz, in analyzing treaty conflict rules in a study for the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, notes that where
neither treaty is clearly more specific, neither lex prior nor lex poste-
rior "[has] been generally accepted as default rules of unwritten
public international law."5 2 Neither rule of interpretation, there-
fore, has risen to the level of becoming a customary rule.
Another frequently invoked interpretive rule is pacta sunt ser-
vanda. Meaning "the agreement shall be honored," this norm is
considered a cornerstone of international law and has been codi-
fied as Article 26 of the VCLT.53 While the application of pacta sunt
servanda is generally accepted, however, its actual effect in a case of
conflicting treaties is not universally agreed upon.
Some scholars interpret pacta sunt servanda as not favoring the
earlier treaty but rather making each treaty enforceable, even
though they may pose potentially incompatible obligations. 54
Others, however, claim that pacta sunt servanda favors the earlier
treaty. Aufricht, for example, argues that pacta sunt servanda would
"interdict" a later treaty between State A and State C if it was with-
out the consent of State B and would "be at variance with previous
treaty obligations" of either A or C toward B.55 Note that under
either theory it is clear that Treaty I shall be honored unless a State
makes the policy choice of breaching and incurring responsibility.
50. Id. (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 31 (Aug. 30); Electricity Company of Sofia, 1939 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No.
77, at 92 (Apr. 4)); see also Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube Advi-
sory Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14, at 23 (Dec. 8).
51. Aufricht, supra note 32, at 700.
52. ANDREA SCHULZ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 14 (Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel.
Doc. No. 24, 2003), http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/genaffLpdl9e.pdf (last visited
Mar. 16, 2005).
53. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
54. See, e.g., Schulz, supra note 52, at 14.
55. Aufricht, supra note 32, at 672-73.
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The disagreement concerns the effect of pacta sunt servanda on
Treaty II: Is the second treaty abrogated or should it simply be fol-
lowed to the fullest extent possible without frustrating the first
treaty?
While this question has stirred much debate among jurists, as in
the cases discussed below, the view that the second treaty is auto-
matically "interdicted" is less persuasive as it collapses pacta sunt
servanda with the lex prior rule. By contrast, interpreting pacta sunt
servanda such that each treaty would remain in effect would give
this rule a meaning different from either lex prior or lex posterior.
Rather than assigning automatic priority to either the earlier or the
later treaty, this interpretation of pacta sunt servanda would thus
give the state the choice and risk of breaching either or both trea-
ties depending on the obligations of the treaties and the state's
actions. This opens the door to state responsibility and places the
burdens on the potentially breaching state or states to negotiate a
solution.
Instead of deciding which treaty controls based on the order of
the conclusion of the treaties in conflict, the interpretive rule lex
specialis focuses on the scope and precision of the treaties, giving
effect to the more narrowly gauged treaty. While this interpretive
norm is not used in the VCLT, lex specialis has traditionally been
applied in conflicts between multilateral treaties of general applica-
tion and in special international regimes for specific issue areas. 56
Lex specialis can also be formulated to focus on the breadth or nar-
rowness of specific clauses. Scope of issue area is not the only way
to interpret lex specialis; some have argued that regimes that cover
only a few states or a specific geographic area may be considered
lex specialis. When applied to treaties as a whole, the lex specialis
rule is usually read to mean that the specific treaty supersedes the
general treaty. In applying lex specialis to conflicts between specific
and general clauses in two instruments, there are three possible
scenarios: (1) the lex specialis rule is applied such that the specific
clause cancels out the general clause; (2) the specific clause is
deemed supplementary to the general clause; or (3) the general
clause is considered as overriding the specific clause.
57
It is not uncommon to see more than one of these general prin-
ciples of interpretation being used to resolve a treaty conflict. Lex
specialis and lex posterior are often used in conjunction with one
56. Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 414.
57. Aufricht, supra note 32, at 697.
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another when the narrower treaty is also the later treaty.5 8 While
these general principles may dovetail in certain instances, inas-
much as they are adopted in large part from domestic canons of
statutory construction, it should be of little surprise that many of
these general principles conflict with one another. In his famous
article on domestic statutory interpretation, Canons of Construction,
Karl Llewellyn showed that "there are two opposing canons on
almost every point."59 The same holds true for general principles
applicable to the interpretation of treaties. For example, there is at
the very least a tension between the notions of lex posterior (favoring
the later treaty) and pacta sunt servanda (favoring the earlier
treaty), if not an outright clash of norms.
The catalog of interpretative canons led to a lack of certainty not
only as to how a treaty should be interpreted but also as to how it
would in fact be interpreted, thus decreasing the value of the treaty
itself, as it was no longer as effective in reducing future uncertainty.
Interpretative ambiguity implicates the perceived efficacy of trea-
ties. The response of the international community was to enact a
bright line rule that would set forth how future treaties would be
formed and interpreted, as well as how conflicts between them
would be resolved. Like other efforts at codification, the end result
defined certain key factors which may or may not have previously
been the focus of debate, but ultimately became issues of material
importance in resolving treaty conflicts. For the VCLT, the inquiry
into resolving treaty conflicts focused on whether or not the trea-
ties were "successive" and whether or not they concerned the
"same subject-matter." The strengths or flaws of the VCLT will
turn on whether these conceptions are responsive to the current
needs of the international community.
C. Treaty Conflicts Prior to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties
The majority of reported international tribunal cases explicitly
addressing the resolution of two conflicting treaties were decided
during the period between World War I and World War II. Some
of the prominent decisions concerning treaty conflict from this
interwar period are helpful in tracing the evolution of the doctrine
that was forming at the time.
58. Id. at 698-99.
59. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950).
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1. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 1916
In 1916 the Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) heard a
treaty dispute which had a significant effect not only on the law of
resolving treaty conflicts but also on Central American politics and
the role of international dispute resolution. 60 At issue was the use
of the San Juan River, which is shared by Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
In 1858 these countries entered into the Cafias-Jerez Treaty, which
provided, in part:
Article 6. The Republic of Nicaragua shall have exclusive
dominion and the highest sovereignty over the waters of the San
Juan River ... but the Republic of Costa Rica shall have in those
waters perpetual rights of free navigation ....
Article 8.... Nicaragua agrees not to conclude [any contracts
for canalization or transit subsequent to this treaty] without first
hearing the opinions of the Costa Rican Government respecting
the disadvantages that may result to the two countries ... and in
the event that the enterprise should cause no injury to the natu-
ral rights of Costa Rica, that opinion shall be advisory. 61
The Cafias-Jerez Treaty soon became a focal point of interpretive
disputes between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, culminating in the two
states seeking binding arbitration. U.S. President Grover Cleve-
land sat as the sole arbitrator and issued an award in 1888 that
found that Costa Rica had a right to navigate the San Juan River
(within certain geographic limits) for commercial purposes and
that:
10. The Republic of Nicaragua remains bound not to make any
grants for canal purposes across her territory without first
asking the opinion of the Republic of Costa Rica ....
11. The Treaty ... does not give the Republic of Costa Rica the
right to be a party to grants which Nicaragua may make for
interoceanic canals; though in cases where the construction
of the canal will involve injury to the natural rights of Costa
Rica, her opinion or advice . .. should be more than "advi-
sory" or "consultative. '62
60. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 181 (Cent. Am. Ct. J. 1916); see also El
Salvador v. Nicaragua, 11 AM.J. INT'L L. 674 (Cent. Am. Ct.J. 1917) (concerning whether
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty violated the 1907 Treaty of Amity among the Central Ameri-
can states). See generally PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, CENTRAL
AMERICAN COURT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION PAGE (n.d.) (information regarding the Central
American Court of Justice (CACJ)), at http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/CACJ.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005); GuYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION 22
(1988).
61. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. at 192-93 (quoting Cafias-Jerez Treaty,
Apr. 15, 1858, Costa Rica-Nicar., art. 6, art. 8, 118 Consol. T.S. 440).
62. Id. at 194 (quoting Cleveland Award, March 22, 1888).
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In July 1913 a Costa Rican newspaper published the text of a
treaty it claimed had been secretly entered into by Nicaragua and
the United States concerning the construction of a canal utilizing
the San Juan River. The Costa Rican Ambassador to Nicaragua
sought an assurance from Nicaragua stating "categorically whether
the text of said convention as therein published is authentic, as
well generally as in each of its paragraphs, and, if not, that you
make the appropriate corrections." 63
The Nicaraguan Secretary of Foreign Relations replied in August
of that year that his government was "keeping secret the conven-
tion entered into with the United States . . . and that, since it
relates to a pact not yet perfected, it is not proper for the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua, on its part... to make any official declaration
regarding any of the steps in such negotiations.'" 64 The Costa
Rican government learned from non-official sources that same
month that the U.S. Senate had had before it a treaty with Nicara-
gua concerning a canal project but that the treaty had been with-
drawn and was being replaced by a new text. Costa Rica was able to
learn nothing more from Nicaragua or the United States and sub-
sequently assumed that the project was dead.
Then, in February 1916, the Costa Rican Ambassador to the
United States saw a small item in the Washington Star reporting that
a canal treaty that had been previously signed by the United States
and Nicaragua was being reported out of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee for advice and consent of the full Senate.
The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was ratified by the United States on
February 18, 1916.65 Its first operative article states:
Article I. The Government of Nicaragua grants in perpetuity to
the Government of the United States, forever free from all taxa-
tion or other public charge, the exclusive proprietary rights nec-
essary and convenient for the construction, operation, and
maintenance of an interoceanic canal by way of the San Juan
River and the great Lake of Nicaragua or by way of any route
over Nicaraguan territory, the details of the terms upon which
such canal shall be constructed, operated, and maintained to be
agreed to by the two Governments whenever the Government of
the United States shall notify the Government of Nicaragua of
its desire or intention to construct such canal.66
63. Id at 187.
64. Id. at 187-88.
65. Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, Feb. 18, 1916, U.S.-Nicar., 34 Stat. 1661.
66. Id. art. I.
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Costa Rica filed suit against Nicaragua before the CACJ to deter-
mine whether the conclusion of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty vio-
lated Nicaragua's obligations and/or Costa Rica's rights under the
Cafias-Jerez Treaty-this case thus concerned two bilateral treaties
with a partial diversity of parties. Costa Rica's argument turned
more on contract theory than on international legal doctrine,
focusing on the texts of the treaties, as "it is to those instruments
alone that she must have recourse for the solution of the differ-
ence that has arisen, for the contract is the supreme law between
the parties whether they be simple individuals or collective political
entities."67 Costa Rica argued that Nicaragua "could not dispose
unrestrictedly of the San Juan River" and that "by virtue of the
Cafias-Jerez Treaty and the Cleveland Award, Costa Rica has a con-
sultative voice which Nicaragua must invoke" in cases such as this.68
Costa Rica sought an order from the CACJ declaring the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty null and void.
Among other arguments, Nicaragua responded that "absolutely
nothing" in the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty "refers to a sale; an option
only is stipulated for the conclusion of a treaty at the appropriate
time."69 Consequently, Nicaragua argued, it would be impossible
to know if and when there actually would be a canal project and, if
so, whether it would be built via the San Juan River or using
another route.
The CACJ found that Nicaragua had been under a legal obliga-
tion to consult with Costa Rica and that Costa Rica "possess [ed] the
right to be heard decisively" regarding any possible canal with a
San Juan River route, although not for any other possible route.
70
Moreover, the CACJ was not persuaded by Nicaragua's defense that
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty only granted an option; rather, the
treaty "effects a perfect sale" because "'[t] o grant in perpetuity' is
to alienate, to transfer ownership . . ." whereas there is no such
alienation in an option.71 The CACJ concluded that the ratifica-
tion of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty violated the rights granted to
Costa Rica in the Cafias-Jerez Treaty. Thus, the lex prior treaty
controlled.
One could argue that the original agreement between Nicaragua
and Costa Rica was honored due to the doctrine of pacta sunt ser-
67. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. at 198.
68. Id. at 197-98 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 204.
70. Id. at 209.
71. Id. at 217-18.
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vanda. This resolution, however, still leaves the legal status of
Treaty II, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, an open question. After
stating its legal conclusion regarding the primacy of the earlier
treaty, the CACJ noted that it did not have jurisdiction over the
United States. Although the United States was a party to Treaty II,
it was not a party to the treaty establishing the CACJ's jurisdiction.
Consequently, any attempt by the CACJ to declare the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty null and void would have no binding force on
the United States.
The CACJ thus concluded as to the legal status of the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty that "this Court can make no declaration what-
soever." 72 The court declared that the later treaty violated Costa
Rica's rights, but was silent regarding the treaty's legal status and as
to remedies for Costa Rica.
2. The Austro-German Customs Union, 1931
Seven years prior to the Anschluss of 1938, in "one of the most
difficult, and from some points of view, one of the most important"
cases considered by the PCIJ, the court assessed the legality of a
customs union that Germany and Austria sought to establish. 73
The Protocol of March 19, 1931 (1931 Protocol), signed by the two
countries, set out their plan "to assimilate the tariff and economic
policies of their respective countries." 74 The government of the
United Kingdom, however, was concerned that the 1931 Protocol
violated the terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed in Sep-
tember 1919 at the conclusion of World War 1, 7 5 and of Protocol
No. I to the Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed in Geneva in 1922
(1922 Protocol).76 Consequently, the United Kingdom sought an
advisory opinion from the PCIJ as to the legal status of the 1931
Protocol.
72. Id. at 229.
73. ALEXANDER P. FACHIRI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: ITS
CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE AND WORK 317 (2d ed. 1932). The Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) was the precursor to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
was part of the League of Nations. Many examples of treaty conflicts arose in the wake of
the Treaty of Versailles as subsequent agreements were assessed in relation to the peace
settlement. While Customs Regime Between Austria and Germany, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
41 (Sept. 5), is one such example of a conflict leading to some insight, most "throw little
light" on the general problem. Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 420 n. 1.
74. Customs Regime, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41 at 50.
75. Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin, Sept. 10, 1919, 49 Stat. 3027, 8
L.N.T.S. 25 [hereinafter Treaty of Saint-Germain].
76. Restoration of Austria, Protocol No. 1 (Declaration), Oct. 4, 1922, 12 L.N.T.S. 386
[hereinafter 1922 Protocol].
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Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain states that:
The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Conse-
quently, Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the
said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or
indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her indepen-
dence, particularly, and until her admission to membership in
the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another
Power.77
While the Treaty of Saint-Germain set forth the basic terms of
the peace between the Allied Powers and Austria, the 1922 Proto-
col set forth the rights and responsibilities of France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Austria
on the other, in the context of economic aid being granted by
these particular Allied Powers to Austria. In this respect, Austria
promised "in accordance with the terms of Article 88 of the Treaty
of Saint-Germain, not to alienate its independence; it will abstain
from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engage-
ment calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this
independence ."7
The question before the PCIJ was "whether, from the point of
view of law, Austria could, without consent of the Council [of the
League of Nations], conclude with Germany the customs union...
without committing an act which would be incompatible with the
obligations she had assumed under the provisions quoted above."
79
Such a formulation did not question whether the act of ratifying the
1931 Protocol was a breach of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and the
1922 Protocol; rather, it asked whether undertaking the acts contem-
plated in the latter protocol would violate the earlier agreements.
The PCIJ was comparing two earlier-in-time multilateral treaties
(the Treaty of Saint-Germain and the 1922 Protocol) with one later
bilateral treaty (the 1931 Protocol) where there was a diversity of
parties between the later bilateral treaty and each of the earlier
multilateral treaties.
The PCIJ concluded that although the proposed customs union
itself would not alienate Austria's independence and thus not
cause a problem under the Treaty of Saint-Germain. However, the
PCIJ reasoned that
77. Id. art. 88.
78. Customs Regime, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41 at 43 (quoting 1922 Protocol, supra
note 76).
79. Id. at 45.
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[i]f the regime projected by the [1931 Protocol] be considered
as a whole from the economic standpoint adopted by the [1922
Protocol], it is difficult to maintain that this regime is not calcu-
lated to threaten the economic independence of Austria and
that it is, consequently, in accord with the undertakings specifi-
cally given by Austria in [the 1922 protocol] with regard to her
economic independence.8 0
The PCIJ thus concluded, by a vote of eight to seven, that such a
regime "would not be compatible" with the 1922 Protocol.81
As with the CACJ's San Juan River Case, the Austro-German Customs
Union opinion is as interesting for what it does not say as for what it
does say. Although the PCIJ found that the 1931 Protocol would
not be compatible with the 1922 Protocol, it does not say what
should be done. As this was an advisory opinion, no remedies were
ordered or damages awarded. The PCIJ simply gave a statement as
to compatibility. While the implication is that the later treaty
would be held void, the PCIJ does not actually state this conclusion
at any point. Thus the PCIJ found, in a manner similar to the
CACJ, that lex prior was the implicitly favored method of conflict
resolution, though the PCIJ did not explicitly void the later treaty.
This follows Quincy Wright's explanation that where there is a
diversity of parties, the earlier treaty remains effective.
3. The Oscar Chinn Case, 1934
The Oscar Chinn Case 2 was concerned with the regulation of
river commerce in the Congo Basin, which was administered by
Belgium as a colonial power. Belgium had enacted new commer-
cial regulations that, Oscar Chinn, a British citizen argued, had the
effect of driving some businesses into bankruptcy. Chinn owned
one of those businesses, and the United Kingdom argued the case
on his behalf before the PCIJ. At issue was whether the Belgian
regulations violated Belgium's obligations under international law.
The court concluded that they did not, but did not clarify which
international legal obligations were implicated. The United King-
dom and Belgium were parties to two treaties concerning com-
merce in the Congo Basin: the Berlin Act of 1885,83 which had
thirteen signatories, and the Convention of Saint-Germain of 1911,
80. Id. at 52.
81. Id. at 53.
82. Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. BeIg.), 1934 P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12).
83. General Act of the Conference of Berlin Respecting the Congo, Feb. 26, 1885, 23
Stat. 332, 165 Consol. T.S. 485, reprinted in 3 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 7 (1909) [hereinafter
Berlin Act].
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which was an inter se agreement among only some of the parties
who had been party to the Berlin Act. The United Kingdom
argued that the Convention superseded the Berlin Act and that the
Belgian law violated Belgium's obligations under the Convention.
The PCIJ's opinion in Oscar Chinn did not turn on an issue of a
treaty conflict. In fact, the majority did not even perceive that such
a conflict was an issue before them. According to three dissenting
judges, this was a grave error. Their opinions shed light on the
jurisprudence of treaty conflicts prior to the VCLT, as they grap-
pled with the question of the effect of a conflict on the later inter se
agreement.
Sir Cecil Hurst of the United Kingdom noted in his dissenting
opinion that the PCIJ should have considered whether the conven-
tion superseded the Berlin Act as between the United Kingdom
and Belgium. At issue, in his view, was whether Belgium and the
United Kingdom had pledged "by the terms of the Berlin Act not
to terminate or to modify, even as between themselves, the provi-
sions of that instrument except in agreement with all other States
which were parties to it."84 According to Judge Hurst, there were
two possible results: (1) that "a new treaty made in violation of such
a pledge would be devoid of juridical effect"; or (2) that such a
treaty "would merely be a wrongful act entitling a State which was
not a party to the Convention of Saint-Germain, but was a party to
the Berlin Act, to demand reparation."85 Judge Hurst did not con-
clude which result this case would produce.
Judge van Eysinga, however, decided to address this issue directly
in his dissenting opinion. He reasoned that the Saint-Germain
Convention was an inter se agreement by some of the parties to the
Berlin Act and was prohibited by the terms of Article 36 of the
Berlin Act, which stated: "The signatory Powers of the present Gen-
eral Act reserve to themselves to introduce into it subsequently,
and by common accord, such modifications and improvements as
experience may show to be expedient."
86
The Berlin Act does not include any means of denunciation or
concluding inter se agreements.8 7 In contrast to the contractual
reasoning used by the CACJ in the case concerning the San Juan
River canal, the interpretive style used by Judge van Eysinga and
84. Id. at 122.
85. Id. at 123.
86. Id. at 133 (van Eysinga, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Berlin Act,
supra note 83, art. 36).
87. Id.
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the other dissenters likens the Berlin Act to legislation rather than
to contract:
The General Act of Berlin does not create a number of contrac-
tual relations between a number of States, relations which maybe replaced as regards some of these States by other contractual
relations; it does not constitute a jus dispositivum, but it provides
the Congo Basin with a regime, a statute, a constitution. This
regime, which forms an indivisible whole, may be modified, butfor this the agreement of all contracting Powers is required.8 8
Moreover, Judge van Eysinga argued that the validity of the Con-
vention of Saint-Germain did not rely on "whether or not any gov-
ernment has disputed its validity[.]" 89 The unstated implication of
his argument is that, due to the obligations under the Berlin Act,
the Convention of Saint-Germain was not valid.
Judge van Eysinga went further than Judge Hurst. Rather thanjust spotting the issue that the Berlin Act and the Convention of
Saint-Germain might conflict, he concluded that they do conflict
and that the earlier treaty should control. He further implied that
the later treaty was invalid. But this final point, the legal status of
the later treaty, is the question that still bedevils the international
legal community. Is it actually invalid or just of secondary impor-
tance to the earlier treaty?
In his dissent, Judge Schficking observed that international legal
doctrine concerning the validity of a later-in-time treaty "is not very
highly developed."90 Nonetheless, he believed that the majority's
implied analysis-that the later treaty can be valid until signatories
to the earlier treaty assert their rights-is incorrect, as it did not
conform with the intention of the states that drafted the Berlin Act.
Inasmuch as they intended to draft an act that could not be modi-
fied by a later inter se agreement, no such later treaty could be valid.
By this argument, the later treaty would be "automatically null and
void."91
All of these discussions however, are in the dissenting opinions.
As the conflict issue was not discussed in the majority's opinion(beyond a reference that both Belgium and the United Kingdom
are signatories to the Convention of Saint-Germain, and that
neither party said it should not apply), whether the majority would
agree with the reasoning of any of the dissenters as to how to
88. Id. at 133-34.
89. Id. at 135.
90. Id. at 148 (Schacking, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 149.
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resolve a treaty conflict is left to conjecture. As Guyora Binder
explained,
[s]ome scholars have argued that the majority's rejection of [the
position of the dissenters] indicated a repudiation of the view
that the latter of two conflicting treaties is void. To the extent
that the majority addressed the issue, however, they were non-
committal; thus, most scholars have considered the case
inconclusive. 92
D. Analysis
While Binder is correct that the Austro-German Customs Regime
case is inconclusive, read in conjunction with the other cases, it is
possible to discern patterns and similarities. Where there was a
diversity of parties between the first and second treaty, the PCIJ
and the CACJ tended to find that the earlier treaty, the lex prior, was
still in effect as a matter of doctrine. Although they relied on lex
prior, the courts nonetheless showed a reluctance to void the later
treaty either on jurisdictional grounds as illustrated in San Juan
River, or by not explicitly recognizing that the later treaty con-
flicted with the earlier treaty, as evident in Oscar Chinn. Rather, the
Austro-German Customs Regime case and the Oscar Chinn dissent
exemplify the observation that since "tacit or implied abrogation
[of an earlier treaty] is not favored," where a later treaty may con-
flict with an earlier treaty, courts are likely to attempt to harmonize
the treaties absent an explicit conflict.93 Sir Humphrey Waldock,
the third Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties for the ILC,
"point[ed] out that the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court,
particularly in the Oscar Chinn and European Commission of the Dan-
ube cases, had rejected inconsistency as a ground for invalidity."
94
These opinions imply that, while there was a doctrinal bias toward
finding that the earlier treaty would remain in effect, none of the
judges, except perhaps for Judge van Eysinga in his Oscar Chinn
dissent, were comfortable with deciding that the later treaty must
be void.
While the tribunals were reluctant to void later agreements, they
also were not eager to actually ratify later inter se agreements. This
was clearest in the Oscar Chinn dissents, but Hans Aufricht also read
the Austro-German Customs Regime case as finding that the customs
union was an inter se treaty that gave Germany certain privileges in
92. BINDER, supra note 60, at 24.
93. Aufricht, supra note 32, at 657.
94. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 15, at 518.
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its relationship with Austria when those privileges were denied to
third parties.95
The PCIJ's Oscar Chinn Case is also notable for Judge van Eys-
inga's analogy to legislation, as opposed to the contractual reason-
ing in the CACJ's San Juan River Case. The Berlin Act was treated as
a quasi-constitutional document, implicitly of a higher order than
the subsequent inter se agreement. While such hierarchization is
not required for van Eysinga's result, it provided rhetorical weight
to his reasoning.
These early opinions highlighted three problems with pre-VCLT
treaty conflicts doctrine. First, it was unclear when a treaty conflict
actually existed. The Oscar Chinn dissenters brought this issue to
the foreground by insisting that a treaty conflict existed but that
the majority just did not see it-or if they did, they did not want to
consider it.
The second main problem of the conflicts doctrine of that time
was the disagreement over the status of the conflicting later-in-time
treaty. In failing to apply the strict forms of lex prior or lex posterior,
the courts seemingly did not want to find either that the earlier
treaty controlled or that the later treaty abrogated it.
The San Juan River Case exemplified the third dilemma of con-
flicts doctrine: the limits of a decentralized legal system. Due to
lack of jurisdiction, judges cannot affect the rights of third parties
who are not part of the treaty system to which the court belongs.
As the United States was not a signatory to the CACJ's foundational
treaty giving that court jurisdiction, the CACJ held that it did not
have the competence to render a decision invalidating the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty and thus affect the rights of the United States.
To address these weaknesses, as well as the vagueness of the gen-
eral principles and customary rules governing treaty conflict reso-
lution, the international community turned to codification of the
rules. This codification, however, turned out to be a less than suc-
cessful solution to treaty conflict resolution, and further led to new
problems.
95. Aufricht, supra note 32, at 678.
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III. THE VCLT AND THE MODERN RESPONSE To
TREATY CONFLICTS
A. Codifying Conflict Rules
The VCLT was but the latest attempt to codify the law of treaties.
Jurists ranging from Bluntschli to David Dudley Field drafted vari-
ous codifications. 96 Especially influential among these early efforts
was the Harvard Law School's Research in International Law, which
published a Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1935.
97
Only after the ILC set to the task of codification, however, did
this project transform from mere aspiration to an actual concerted
effort among states. A series of ILC Rapporteurs tackled the vari-
ous issues of codification; unfortunately, they did not agree when it
came to the issue of treaty conflicts. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, in his
first report to the ILC as the Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties,
concluded that Treaty II "would be void if its performance involved
breach of a treaty obligation previously undertaken by one or more
of the contracting parties."98 Next, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Lauter-
pacht's successor, concluded that Treaty II would be invalidated
only if its conflict with Treaty I concerned an issue of jus cogens-
peremptory norms of international law; otherwise, the parties
should reconcile amongst themselves incompatibilities between
the treaties.99 Ultimately, Sir Humphrey Waldock, the third Rap-
porteur, "abandoned the invalidity aspect" altogether. 00
Although during their twenty years of study and drafting the ILC
Rapporteurs held differing views as to the best methods for resolv-
ing treaty conflicts,, the VCLT was finally completed and opened
for signature in 1969. It came into force in 1980, and as of 2005,
has ninety parties.101 As with any treaty, only states that have
signed and ratified the VCLT are bound by it. Nonetheless, a
"good number of the Convention's provisions reflect pre-existing
96. See JOHANN KASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE: DES TRAITS
(3d. ed. 1881), reprinted in 29 Am.J. INT'L L. SuPP. 1208 (1935); DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, OUT-
LINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE: TREATIES (1876), reprinted in 29 AM.J. INT'L L. Supp. 1207
(1935).
97. HARVARD RESEARCH IN INT'L LAw, DRAr CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 29
AMJ. INT'L L. SuPP. 657 (1935).
98. SIABTAi ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 86-87 (1985). This was slightly modified in
Lauterpacht's second report "to refer specifically to a bilateral or a multilateral treaty or
any provision thereof, while the last phrase of the condition was reworded to read 'to
impair an essential aspect of [the prior treaty's] original purpose.'" Id. at 87.
99. Id.
100. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 15, at 518.
101. UNITED NATIONS, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION: ACCESS TO DATABASES, at http://
untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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practices and the prevailing opiniojuris."10 2 Although the interna-
tional legal community largely views the VCLT as a codification of
current customary international law, at the time of its conclusion
there was no agreed-upon state practice for the resolution of treaty
conflicts.1 03
As is generally the case in codifications, the VCLT attempts to
draw bright line rules. The VCLT's treaty conflict rules appear in
Article 30, and they apply to "successive treaties relating to the
same subject-matter. '"1o4 Although originally a cause of some disa-
greement, states now generally agree that determining the time of
the earlier treaty is based on date of adoption, not entry into
force. 105
Paragraph 2 of VCLT Article 30 gives treaty drafters the opportu-
nity to decide how successive treaties should be prioritized with
respect to their legal effect: "When a treaty specifies that it is sub-
ject to, or that it is not to be considered incompatible with, an ear-
lier or later treaty, the provisions of the other treaty prevail."' 0 6
However, as will be evident, the most common problem is when
the parties have not signaled their intentions. The VCLT then con-
siders, in Paragraph 3, the case of complete unity of parties, stating
that: "[if] the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended under
Article 59 [of the VCLT], the earlier treaty applies only to the
extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty."10 7
According to the ILC Commentary, Article 30 "comes into play
only after it has been determined under [Article 59] that the parties did not
intend to abrogate, or wholly to suspend the operation of the earlier
treaty."lOS Article 59, for its part, is of limited use, applying only
102. Bernhardt, supra note 17, at 927; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Introductory Note
(1987) (viewing VCLT as indicative of customary international law on treaties).
103. Schulz, supra note 52, at 13.
104. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 30(1).
105. AuST, supra note 35, at 183.
106. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 30(2).
107. Id. art. 30(3).
108. [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 253; see also U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF., FINAL
CLAUSES OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES: HANDBOOK 85, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003)
("[Ulnless there is evidence of contrary intention, the parties are presumed to have
intended to terminate or modify the earlier treaty when they conclude a subsequent treaty
that is incompatible with the earlier one.") [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES HAND-
BOOK], http://untreaty.un.org/English/FinalClauses/Handbook.pdf (last visited Mar. 18,
2005).
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when all the parties to Treaty I are also parties to Treaty 11.109
Thus, if the earlier treaty is not completely abrogated, one applies
Article 30, making the earlier treaty subsidiary to the later treaty.
Furthermore, Article 30 provides that the earlier treaty only applies
to the extent that it is compatible with the later treaty. In all other
respects, the later treaty holds; thus, A.ticle 30(3) effectively codi-
fies the lex posterior rule. 110
Article 30(4) considers the more difficult case of when the later
treaty does not include all of the parties of the earlier treaty. The
VCLT states that the rule set forth in Paragraph 3 (the lex posterior
rule) applies to states that are party to both treaties. When one
state is party to both treaties and another state is only party to one,
then the treaty to which they both belong governs their
relationship.11
Although the VCLT was a good attempt at a solution to the prob-
lem of treaty conflicts, its flaws are becoming more evident as state
practice evolves. I will first turn to some of the problematic issues
that have become apparent in the theory behind Article 30,and
then, in Part C, consider how Article 30 and the related general
principles have been applied in practice, or may be applied in cer-
tain scenarios.
B. Codifying Solutions and Discovering New Problems
1. Discerning Which Treaties Have the Same Subject-Matter
First, by its terms, the VCLT is only applicable when supposedly
conflicting treaties are successive and related to the "same subject-
matter." Aust argued that "[t] he meaning of the expression 'relat-
ing to the same subject-matter' is not clear but should probably be
construed strictly, so that the article would not apply when a gen-
eral treaty impinges indirectly on the content of a particular provi-
sion of an earlier treaty."11 2 Consequently, the VCLT is not
applicable to the thornier issues of what happens when treaties
have different foci but overlapping issue areas. Moreover, the Arti-
cle 30 rules would not be well calibrated if applied to these dilem-
mas. For example, if States A, B, C, and D have a human rights
109. See E.M. Vierdag, The Time of Conclusion of a Multilateral Treaty, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 75, 91 (1988).
110. See MULTILATERAL TRFATIES HANDBOOK, supra note 108, at 85 ("[I]n the case of
successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter concluded among the same parties,
the principle of lex posterior derogat priori applies.").
111. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 30(4).
112. AUST, supra note 35, at 183 (citations omitted).
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treaty among themselves and then subsequently negotiate a trade
agreement with implications concerning human rights, it is ques-
tionable whether one should simply conclude that the earlier
human rights treaty applies only to the extent that its norms are
consistent with the trade accord.
2. The Problem of Successive Treaties
The drafting of Article 30 presents yet another problem. Article
30 refers to "States parties to successive treaties," yet, as Vierdag
points out, "a treaty that is only adopted has as yet no 'parties' in
the sense of Article 2(1) (g) (a 'party' is a State bound by a treaty
and for which the treaty is in force)." 113 The issue, therefore, is a
question of when a state becomes bound by the rules of Article 30.
Vierdag argues that while Article 30 constructs a conflict resolu-
tion regime based on the idea of "successive" treaties, this "does
not necessarily correspond at all with the actual acquisition of
rights and the incidence of obligations under treaties in force by
particular States parties to them."'1 14
3. The Written and Unwritten Rules of Conflict Resolution
The VCLT is not merely a summary of the rules of conflict reso-
lution. Rather, it is one aspect of treaty conflict resolution that may
affect certain cases. Alongside the VCLT, the general principles of
treaty conflicts still exist, as do various drafting and procedural
techniques, such as clauses of abrogation and precedence. Andrea
Schulz's gloss on the current conflict rules (incorporating both the
VCLT and general principles) is that
in the absence of a clause [of precedence or abrogation,] the
prevailing treaty would normally be the more specific one, no
matter whether it is earlier or later than the more general
treaty .... If none of the instruments concerned is more spe-
cific than the other, the more recent treaty will prevail in case of
incompatibility of individual provisions. 115
According to Schulz, the "same subject-matter" clause is gener-
ally read narrowly in order to have recourse to the lex specialis
rules.1 16 As lex specialis was not incorporated in the VCLT, it can
be applied only if in the interpretation stage it is found that the
treaties in question are not the same subject-matter and thus not
113. Vierdag, supra note 109, at 94-95 (paraphrasing VCLT, supra note 13, art
2(l)(g)).
114. Id. at 97.
115. Schulz, supra note 52, at 6.
116. See id.
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within the purview of VCLT Article 30. In such a case, the deci-
sionmaker may apply general principles of interpretation and con-
flict resolution, such as the lex specialis principle.
In this manner we find that policymakers facing a potential con-
flict have to make judgment calls as to whether they believe the
issue is governed by the VCLT. If it is not, then they must assess
which general principles best apply and how the rules may affect
potential negotiations to resolve the conflict.
While the codification of treaty conflict rules in the VCLT
marked a new era in treaty law, Article 30 of the VCLT has in prac-
tice been applied only occasionally. In an era of greater-than-ever
treaty congestion, why are we not seeing greater use of the VCLT
by tribunals? As one jurist observed on the topic of conflicting
treaties, "[t]here is . .. little judicial precedent, and diplomatic
practice seems to be more expressive of political rather than legal
considerations."' 1 7 There are two aspects to this observation. First,
although formal adjudication may assist conflict resolution, it may
be difficult for the parties to determine which tribunal or tribunals
would have jurisdiction. Consequently, states may avoid the use of
tribunals altogether for fear of further complicating a situation
they would prefer to resolve relatively quickly.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, states and tribunals have
rarely mentioned the possibility that two treaties might conflict.
International tribunal cases that have wrestled with questions of
treaty conflict are primarily from the era of the League of Nations.
Why have we not seen similar adjudication applying the VCLT
since World War II? When instances of treaty conflicts are men-
tioned it is usually by academics or other observers. Further, when
such conflicts do attract the attention of decisionmakers, they tend
to be resolved in ad hoc political bargains rather than by an applica-
tion of blackletter principles.
The following cases represent a range of fact patterns. Some are
actual conflicts that resulted in political negotiations; others are
drawn from analyses of potential conflicts; and still others are
hypotheticals posed by academics. The cases are divided into two
groups. The first group concerns treaties that have the same sub-
ject-matter. As these are the types of conflicts the VCLT addresses,
I will compare actual state practice to expected doctrine. The sec-
ond group of cases concern treaties that do not have the same sub-
ject-matter foci, but whose effects overlap and possibly frustrate
117. Karl, supra note 16, at 936.
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one another. While VCLT Article 30 does not apply, it is necessary
to consider these incidents, as they are possibly the most prevalent
and significant form of treaty conflict today.
C. The VCLT and Treaty Conflict Resolution in Practice
1. Recent Incidents: Same Subject-Matter
Most, if not all, recent incidents of treaty conflicts have not been
resolved by tribunals but by political negotiation. Of particular
interest in the following cases is the theory that treaties that may
affect each others' goals do not conflict because they do not regu-
late the "same subject-matter." Such an argument is neither legally
correct nor practically sound.
a. The Caspian Sea Treaties
One brewing disagreement concerns which treaty, or treaties,
governs the exploitation of the huge reservoirs of oil beneath the
Caspian Sea. 118 Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turk-
menistan all border the Caspian Sea, sail its waters, exploit the
resources of the sea itself, and either currently drill or expect to
drill for oil beneath the sea-bed. The preexisting legal regime gov-
erning navigation on the Caspian Sea and use of its resources is a
1940 bilateral treaty between the Soviet Union and Iran, establish-
ing a condominium over the Caspian Sea.1 19 In the wake of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, four successor states with different
interests now border the Caspian Sea. The new Caspian littoral
states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) have
begun drafting treaties among themselves regarding the disposi-
tion of the Caspian Sea.' 20 The growing concern is over which
legal regime or regimes among the Iran-U.S.S.R. Treaty and the
new treaties should control.
Under the law of state succession, a new state arising out of the
dissolution of a previous state is bound by that existing state's trea-
118. See generally Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian
Sea, 94 Am. J. INr'L L. 179 (2000); Faraz Sanei, Note, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline
Diplomacy, and the Prospects for Iran's Isolation from the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran 's
Legal Options with Its Geopolitical Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 681 (2001); Kaveh L.
Afrasiabi, The Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea: Beyond the Conflicting Treaties, available at http:/
/www.payvand.com/mews/o3/sep.1106.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2003).
119. See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 25, 1940, Iran-U.S.S.R., 144 BRIT. &
FOREIGN ST. PAPERs 419 (1940-1942) (translated from the Persian).
120. See Mehdiyoun, supra note 118, at 183-87; Sanei, supra note 118, at 755-60.
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ties.1 21 In this case, only Russia has explicitly stated that it would
remain bound by the Soviet Union's international commitments.
In practice, however, there has been a case-by-case analysis with
respect to which of the other republics are bound by which
treaties.
The new states contend that, even if the 1940 treaty was in force,
it would either be modified by the later treaties, or-in Azerbai-
jan's view-not be of legal consequence because it does not cover
the same subject-matter as the new treaties.' 22 The Iran-U.S.S.R.
Treaty was signed prior to the discovery of oil beneath the Caspian
sea-bed, and accordingly did not consider the possibility of oil.
Based on this reasoning, the new states are attempting to negotiate
a more favorable legal regime, while Iran is reticent to drop its
claim that the earlier treaty still governs.
Although a key factor in this incident is the proper application
of the law of state succession (a topic beyond the scope of this arti-
cle), this case is nonetheless indicative of modern problems con-
cerning treaty conflicts. Assume that Russia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are all still bound by the original
Iran-U.S.S.R. Treaty: What is the result? Some new states have
argued that, inasmuch as the treaty does not concern the same sub-
ject-matter as any later agreement, it is irrelevant in the disposition
of subsoil drilling rights. 123 This case illustrates how a rigid use of
the same-subject-matter clause can provide justification for seem-
ingly related treaties to be viewed as distinct. The purpose of the
1940 treaty was to establish a condominium between Iran and the
Soviet Union over the Caspian Sea. Simply maintaining that the
treaty is not of the same subject-matter is not a legally satisfying
response.
Moreover, this approach reinterprets what was essentially juris-
dictional language in the VCLT-stating that Article 30 would apply
in cases of successive treaties of the same subject-matter-as defini-
tional language stating that a treaty conflict can only exist when
treaties are concerned with the same subject-matter. This miscon-
strues the purpose of the VCLT, which does not attempt to define
when a conflict does or does not exist but rather only assigns rules
of conflict resolution in certain circumstances. In arguing that
121. See generally Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,
Aug. 23, 1978, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
122. See Afrasiabi, supra note 118, at *1-*2; Sanei, supra note 118, at 755 (concerning
Azerbaijan).
123. Id.
2005]
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
there is no conflict between the later treaties and the 1940 Treaty,
the new littoral states have moved into novel legal territory as to
what comprises a treaty conflict.
While asserting that the treaties do not concern the same sub-
ject-matter and thus do not conflict is neither an accurate descrip-
tion of the facts in this case nor of the state of the law in general, it
is equally unsatisfying simply to conclude that these new states
must be bound by a 1940 treaty signed by a now-dissolved,
undemocratic, imperial government. The disposition of the Cas-
pian Sea is an example of the need for good faith negotiations
among the parties. The issue is not whether states should be able
to negotiate-rather, the issue is whether there is a proper under-
standing of the legal status quo when the negotiations begin. Such
negotiations, however, are most likely to be successful if the expec-
tations of the parties are taken into account at the beginning of
negotiations. Iran's expectations are defined in part by its belief
that the treaties are in conflict and that international law would
favor the enforcement of the 1940 treaty. The new littoral states'
expectations are formed in part by their argument that the treaties
are not in conflict, and even if they were, international law would
favor the later treaties. Such mismatched expectations complicate
negotiations. A clearer set of guidelines leading to shared expecta-
tions as to which treaty or treaties would be favored under interna-
tional law would give the parties a better sense of the relative
strength of their negotiating positions. While the legal strength of
a negotiating position may have little or no impact on certain nego-
tiations, at the margins, it provides the parties a sense that, should
negotiations fail and third-party dispute resolution be invoked, one
party may have a distinct advantage. Thus, effective treaty conflict
rules may not necessarily be applied, but they may contextualize
and facilitate political negotiations.
b. Government Procurement in the European Union
The clash between E.U. regulations and a preexisting treaty
between Germany and the United States provides a recent example
of a conflict that resulted in political bargaining rather than in any
principled application of conflict resolution rules.124
124. Portions of the following narrative are drawn fromJulie Grimes, Comment: Conflicts
Between EC Law and International Treaty Obligations: A Case Study of the German Telecommunica-
tions Dispute, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 535 (1994); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FY 2001
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: EUROPEAN UNION (2001) [hereinafter DOS Report], http://
www.globalatlanticpartners.com/pdf/eu-ccg200l.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2004); U.S.
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The conflict concerned Germany's obligations to the United
States under the German/U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation (FCN Treaty), in light of its competing obligations
under the Treaty of Rome (establishing the European Community
(E.C.)) and subsequent E.U. legislation. 125 The FCN Treaty, which
predated the Treaty of Rome, included a section on nondiscrimi-
nation in government procurement allowing the United States to
receive most favored nation treatment, which entitled U.S. compa-
nies to receive the same treatment as the best rate given to the
companies of any nationality-German or foreign-in government
procurement.
In 1993, the European Union enacted the E.U. Utilities Directive
(Directive), which provided that when a company from a state that
is not a member of the E.U. bids on a procurement contract solic-
ited by an E.U. state, the E.U. state will mark-up the non-member-
state company bid by a certain percentage, thus making such com-
panies relatively uncompetitive compared to bidders from E.U.
member states. 126
Germany, relying on Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome, con-
cluded that the FCN Treaty governed any utilities procurement
bids submitted by U.S. companies. Germany used a treaty that was
not only earlier-in-time to the Directive, but also arguably a neces-
sary context within which the Directive must be interpreted.
27
Other E.U. states were concerned with this result, as six other E.U.
Department of State, U.S. Concerned by Government Procurement Practices, May 5, 2001,
reprinted in part in WASHINGTON FILE [hereinafter Washington File], at http://usembassy-
australia.state.gov/hyper/2001/0501/epf208.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2004); TRADE NEWS
BULLETIN, Feb. 3, 1993, at http://www.etext.org/Politics/Trade.News/Volume.2/tnb-02.
021 (last visited Aug. 18, 2004)
125. Id. at 536-37; see Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
U.S.-F.R.G., 7 U.S.T. 1839; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
126. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANNUAL REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN GOV-
ERNMENT PROCUREMENT 4 (2001).
127. Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome provides:
The rights and obligations arising from conventions concluded before the
entry into force of this Treaty between one or more Member States, on the one
hand, and one or more third countries on the other hand, shall not be affected
by the provisions of this Treaty.
In so far as such conventions are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member
State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate any incom-
patibility found to exist. Member States shall, if necessary, assist each other in
order to achieve this purpose and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common
attitude.
Member States shall, in the application of the conventions referred to in the
first paragraph, take due account of the fact that the advantages accorded under
this Treaty by each Member State form an integral part of the establishment of
the Community and are therefore inseparably linked with the creation of com-
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members had such provisions in FCN treaties with the United
States and possibly other similar provisions in bilateral treaties with
other non-E.U. countries. If Germany's interpretation of its obliga-
tions under international law were correct, the effectiveness of the
Directive and of other E.U. legislation would be moot.
The other E.C. countries objected to the German interpreta-
tion. 128 The European Community pushed for the mark-up to be
applied against U.S. companies, prompting the United States to
respond with retaliatory tariffs against E.C. goods. 129 After a time,
the United States and the European Community negotiated a side
agreement allowing U.S. companies to bid on contracts in certain
sectors without a mark-up.
The VCLT would have favored the U.S. claim against Germany
on the logic that Germany's preexisting commitment to the United
States was not extinguished by the Treaty of Rome. Germany could
have been in breach of the FCN had it marked up U.S. bids.
The relevant VCLT provisions notwithstanding, this dispute
turned into an E.C.-U.S. trade skirmish, highlighting how the rules
of treaty conflict resolution have fallen into disuse, even in cases
that seemingly come under the sweep of VCLT Article 30.
2. Recent Incidents: Different Subjects, Overlapping Interests
a. Trade and the Protection of Endangered Species
i. SPAW and CITES
Professor Chris Wold has analyzed whether there is a conflict
between the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas of
Wildlife (SPAW) 130 to the Convention for the Protection and
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean,
and the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).131 Wold's analysis of
mon institutions, the conferring of competences upon such institutions and the
granting of the same advantages by all other Member States.
Id. art. 234.
128. Grimes, supra note 124, at 541.
129. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 126, at 4 ("After bilateral negotiations did
not resolve this issue, the United States imposed sanctions in May 1993.").
130. Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean
Region, Jan. 18, 1990, S. TirEATv Doc. No. 103-5 (1993) [hereinafter SPAW], available at
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/spaw.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
131. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; see CHRIS WOLD, LEGAL ASSESSMENT
OF COMPATIBILITY ISSUES BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING SPECIALLY PROTECTED AREAS
AND WILDLIFE (SPAW) TO THE CARTAGENA CONVENTION AND THE CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
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whether there is a conflict between Articles 10 and 11 of SPAW and
the trade measures of CITES is particularly interesting for the dif-
ferent modes of reasoning he employed in concluding that there is
no conflict.132 SPAW entered into force in 2000 and currently has
11 parties; CITES entered into force in 1975 and currently has 164
parties.
Articles 10 and 11 of SPAW require state parties to regulate com-
mercial trade in species that it lists as endangered or threatened.
133
States are prohibited from trading in plant and animal species that
are listed on SPAW Annexes I and II. By contrast, CITES regulates
trade in the species on its appendices through the use of import
and export licenses, but only prohibits commercial trade in species
listed on CITES Appendix I, permitting trade for educational and
conservation-driven purposes.
134
Wold argued that SPAW and CITES do not concern the same
subject-matter.13 5 Citing Ian Sinclair, he noted that "relating to the
same subject-matter" must be strictly construed.13 6 Wold con-
cluded that "SPAW generally covers conservation and management
of listed species while CITES focuses specifically on regulating
trade in species adversely affected by trade." 137 Instead of applying
the VCLT, he turned to general principles of treaty construction.
Assessing whether lex posterior should be applied, Wold con-
cluded that dating which treaty is first-in-time is overly problematic.
Although dates when the treaties came into force are clearly estab-
TIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA (CITES) (1999), http://
www.Iclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/opinionspaw.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
132. WOLD, supra note 131, at 12-14.
133. Article 10 of the SPAW states, in part:
1. Each Party shall identify endangered or threatened species of flora and fauna
within areas over which it exercises sovereignty, or sovereign rights orjurisdic-
tion, and accord protected status to such species. Each Party shall regulate and
prohibit according to its laws and regulations, where appropriate, activities
having adverse effects on such species or their habitats and ecosystems, and
carry out species recovery, management, planning and other measures to
effect the survival of such species. Each Party, in keeping with its legal system,
shall also take appropriate actions to prevent species from becoming endan-
gered or threatened.
2. With respect to protected species of flora and their parts and products, each
Party, in conformity with its laws and regulations, shall regulate, and where
appropriate, prohibit all forms of destruction and disturbance, including the
picking, collecting, cutting, uprooting or possession of, or commercial trade
in, such species.
SPAW, supra note 130, art. 10.
134. CITES Art. III (1975) available at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#III
(last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
135. WOLD, supra note 131, at 9-10.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Id.
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lished, his concern was whether the relevant dates should instead
be the dates when the specific species are entered onto the
annexes and appendices. This practice would make any temporal
rule extremely difficult to administer. Turning next to the lex
specialis rule, Wold noted that, as CITES is focused on international
trade, CITES is more specific than SPAW.
Concentrating on the international trade provisions of SPAW,
Wold argued that a prohibition of trade under SPAW does not frus-
trate a party's ability to implement CITES when a species is listed
under both treaties unless CITES required a party to allow trade
that would be rejected under SPAW. 138 This is an application of the
narrowest possible definition of "conflict." As argued above in Part
I such a strict definition simply does not address the situations that
concern policymakers-such as when one treaty can frustrate the
purpose of another treaty. In this instance, Wold is using a mode
of analysis more akin to the techniques of conflict of laws than to
the contractual analysis of the CACJ in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua.1 39
In sum, Wold's analysis is of interest for three reasons: (1) his
finding that SPAW and CITES do not pass the "same subject-mat-
ter" test; (2) the difficulty of determining which treaty would be
first in time; and (3) his implicit analogy to domestic conflict of
laws doctrine.
Arguing that SPAW and CITES are not related to the same sub-ject-matter exemplifies how the VCLT as construed today would
not be applied to the conflicts that have caused such concern in
recent years: conflicts between treaties that regulate overlapping
areas from different perspectives -in this case trade and endan-
gered species protection. Not applying the VCLT relegates the
question to the panoply of general principles of conflict and the
canons of treaty interpretation, which can lead to varying expecta-
tions among the parties as to which principle should be applied
and thus which treaty should be enforced.
Wold's own analysis focused on the problem of which treaty was
first in time. He acknowledged that there are many possible ways
to date these treaties, particularly due to the various entries in the
annexes and appendices. Similarly, his conclusion that a trade
treaty is more specific than a species protection treaty is elo-
quent-but the opposite argument could be made just as convinc-
138. Id. at 8.
139. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). For a compari-
son of conflicts of treaties to conflict of laws, see Gregory H. Fox, International Organiza-
tions: Conflicts of International Law, 95 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 183 (2001).
[Vol. 37
Resolving Treaty Conflicts
ingly. At times, specificity is in the eye of the beholder. These
observations reinforce the importance of drafting procedures that
promote shared expectations as to which treaty would control.
ii. The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO
Other commentators have asked whether the norms of the
Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Biosafety Protocol) regulating the international movement of bio-
engineered living organisms conflict with the trade regime set
forth in the WTO Agreements. The potential breadth of the
Biosafety Protocol illustrates the difficulty of drafting new treaties
that do not overlap with previous treaties. As Sabrina Safrin
observed, "given the breadth of biotechnology, which encom-
passes, inter alia, microbes, medicine, food, forests, and fish, as well
as research and commerce, the negotiators faced a palpable risk of
unintentionally modifying other agreements through the provi-
sions of the Protocol."
1 40
First, one should examine whether the Biosafety Protocol has a
savings clause or other similar clause that would avoid conflicts
between the treaties. In fact, the parties to the Biosafety Protocol
have been criticized for not drafting an effective savings clause.
1 4 1
Rather than including a traditional clause of precedent or of abro-
gation within one of the operative articles, the parties included the
following language in the preamble:
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be
mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable
development,
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as imply-
ing a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any
existing international agreements,
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to sub-
ordinate this Protocol to other international agreements .... 
142
140. Sabrina Safrin, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organi-
zation Agreement, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 614 (2002).
141. JEFFREY WAINCYMER, CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 1, 15 (n.d.) (noting also
that "it would have been extremely simple to protect those rights by a clearly expressed
savings clause"), http://www.apec.org.au/docs/waincymer200l.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2005).
142. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan.
29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
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An opposing view maintains that not only is the savings clause
adequate, it is possibly unnecessary. 143 Proponents of this view also
recognize, however, that states
that pressed for the inclusion of a savings clause to make clear
that WTO disciplines continue to apply to trade in LMOs cov-
ered by the [Biosafety] Protocol were concerned that, absent
the inclusion of such a clause, some countries might implement
the Protocol in a manner that violated their WTO
obligations. 144
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the absence of a usable sav-
ings clause, do the VCLT's rules increase certainty as to the rela-
tionship between the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO
Agreements? First, one must decide whether these treaties are con-
cerned with the same subject-matter. The most common answer is
that they are not. Construing "same subject-matter" narrowly leads
to the conclusion that one treaty deals with trade, the other with
the environment. Once again, the VCLT would not apply to the
resolution of this particular conflict.
If the states are party to both treaties, under lex posterior the later
treaty applies. However, if one treaty is more specialized, ex
specialis applies. If there are more than two states involved in the
potential conflict and there is imperfect diversity, then as between
any two states, the treaty to which they are both party controls.
Under such circumstances, without clear rules or procedures
that the parties can apply themselves, the parties may seek adjudi-
cation, but will likely be uncertain as to which tribunal possessesjurisdiction over the dispute. Assessing the relationship of the
Biosafety Protocol to the WTO Agreements calls into question the
role of dispute resolution in a decentralized system: If states party
to both treaty regimes disagree as to which treaty applies in a given
case, which treaty's dispute resolution mechanism should apply?
For example, if a party sought review by the WNTO Dispute Resolu-
tion Board, would that tribunal be competent-either in the juris-
dictional sense or in the broader sense of having the necessary
expertise-to assess the Biosafety Protocol and its relationship to
143. For example, Professor Sabrina Safrin, a former State Department lawyer involved
with the negotiations believes that
while the "savings clause" language ultimately included in the Biosafety Protocol
preserves countries' rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements, the
Biosafety Protocol and the VITO Agreements are less on a collision course than
some may fear, and the importance of the savings clause may have been overesti-
mated by all sides to the controversy.
Safrin, supra note 140, at 607.
144. Id. at 610-11.
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the relevant WTO agreements? 45 This issue presents a second
level of treaty conflict: when the conflicting treaties themselves
have different-and possibly conflicting-modes of dispute resolu-
tion. While this issue has been a topic of much academic
debate, 14 6 no international tribunal or international organization
has spoken clearly to the issue. This observation highlights that,
absent adequate institutionalized dispute resolution, the existence
of rules and procedures that the parties can use themselves to solve
conflicts is critical.
b. Vierdag's Radio Regulations Scenario
Vierdag suggested a particularly interesting scenario: whether
the International Radio Regulations (IRR), adopted by the World
Administrative Radio Conference in 1971, could be considered to
conflict with the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),' 4 7 concluded in 1966.148
In assessing whether two treaties are concerned with the same
subject-matter, Vierdag suggested that "[i]f an attempted simulta-
neous application of two rules to one set of facts or actions leads to
incompatible results it can be safely assumed that the test for same-
ness is satisfied."1 49 He argued that the IRR regulation would be
considered an abrogation of ICCPR Article 19(2).150
This conflict could implicate lex specialis. Based on the broad
wording of Article 19(2), which frustrates any special particulari-
ties, Vierdag concluded "[i] t is not proper to apply a principle such
as generalia specialibus non derogant if the generalia in one instrument
are so phrased as to rule out any specialia in another
instrument."151
Vierdag identified the problem of time of conclusion:
145. See WVAINCYMER, supra note 141, at 5.
146. See generally SHttAi, supra note 9; Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of Interna-
tional Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709 (1999); Char-
ney, Is International Law Threatened, supra note 9; Charney, Impact, supra note 9.
147. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
148. Regarding the International Radio Regulations, see generally Vierdag, supra note
109, at 98 n.80.
149. Id. at 100.
150. Id. Article 19(2) states: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice." ICCPR, supra note 147, art. 19(2).
151. Vierdag, supra note 109, at 100.
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If State A became party to the Covenant in 1978, and the Radio
Regulations became operative for it in 1982, the latter prevails,
whereas for neighboring State B, which acceded to the Cove-
nant in 1984, these Regulations are superseded by the Cove-
nant. It is important to point out here that "A" and "B" may also
stand for groups of two or more States. 152
Vierdag's observations prefigured Wold's concerns regarding
the concept of successive treaties: which is earlier and which is
later. Vierdag illustrated that this problem becomes even more
complex in multilateral treaties, as there are more possible
permutations.
c. The Judgments Convention and Possible Conflicts
Andrea Schulz's analysis of possible treaty conflicts resulting
from the adoption of a proposed Convention on Jurisdiction, Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters (Judgments Convention) included the following
hypothetical. Suppose that "a number of States . . . have con-
cluded a treaty on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, and
the only basis of (exclusive) jurisdiction is the nationality of a par-
ticular person (e.g. of the child in cases of child protection mea-
sures)."'153 A subset of those states then conclude an inter se
agreement that does two things: (1) bases jurisdiction on habitual
residence and not on nationality; and (2) allows for enforcement
of judgments from any other state party to Treaty II without any
inquiry into whether the rendering state had jurisdiction.154 Con-
sider that States A, B, and C are parties to Treaty I but only A and B
are parties to Treaty II. If State A exercises jurisdiction over a
national of State C based on habitual residence and a party subse-
quently seeks to have the decision enforced through State B, as
between A and B, Treaty II controls, mandating enforcement.155
As between B and C, Treaty I is in force and B may only enforcejudgments that the rendering state based on nationality, which, in
this case, was not the basis of judgment.
This scenario was proposed as exemplifying, if not the violation
of a right, then the frustration of the object and purpose of a
treaty. 15 6 The first issue that "is not easy to determine" is whether
152. Id. at 101-02.
153. Schultz, supra note 52, at 11 n.35.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 11.
[Vol. 37
Resolving Treaty Conflicts
Treaty II actually affected State C's rights under Treaty I.157 This
scenario underscores how third parties may be affected by later
treaties. 158 One may argue that under the VCLT this later agree-
ment was a breach of Treaty I, due to the. prohibitions of Article 41,
which states that inter se agreements may be concluded only when,
among other factors, the modification "does not affect the enjoy-
ment by the other parties of their rights under the [first] treaty or
the performance of their obligations."'159 Schulz argues that, even
if Treaty II was read to violate Article 41, it would still be favored
due to the lex posterior rule-although in this case State B may face
state responsibility in relation to State C. Schulz also notes that
state practice has evolved such that this result is not followed and is
often avoided by use of carve-out clauses in the later treaty, which
protect the rights of third parties to the earlier treaty.
160
Schulz's hypothetical exemplifies how the rules of the VCLT,
which allow each treaty to control as between its members, provide
no real solution to the underlying conflict. Rather, the VCLT rules
merely put the problem back into the arena of diplomatic
negotiation.
D. Comparing and Contrasting the Effects of Different Conflict
Resolution Techniques
These examples indicate not only some of the problems in the
current state of treaty conflicts doctrine, but also how state practice
has evolved. To envision how well the VCLT has responded to the
problems posed by the preexisting customary system, one may
hypothesize how the San Juan River Case, the Austro-German Customs
Union Case, and the Oscar Chinn Case might have been decided had
the VCLT been the controlling law. Following this examination, I
will turn to the modern incidents and consider them in compari-
son to the earlier cases.
1. Reading the Early Opinions in Light of the VCLT
The CACJ's opinion in the San Juan River Case161 is noteworthy in
part for its doctrinal result favoring the earlier treaty. If this case
157. Id. at 11 n.35.
158. Schulz notes that there are no existing treaties that overlap the Judgments Con-
vent and explicitly allow inter se modifications. Id. at 12. This does not mean, however, that
such modifications will not be attempted in a given treaty regime.
159. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 41(1) (b) (i).
160. Schulz, supra note 52, at 12 n.37.
161. See supra Part II.C.1 and accompanying discussion.
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had been decided under the VCLT, assuming that the two treaties
would have been considered as having the same subject-matter,
Article 30(4) (b) would have applied such that the earlier treaty-
the Cafias-Jerez Treaty-would govern the relationship between
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty would
govern the relationship between the United States and Nicaragua.
This result does not actually resolve the conflict. Such a rule pro-
vides that both treaties would be valid, and, assuming that Nicara-
gua cannot undertake all its obligations in both treaties, Article
30(4) (b) gives Nicaragua the choice of which treaty it would honor
and which it would breach. Thus, the VCLT would not make the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty void ab initio. Article 30(4) (b) has a rule
based on actual performance as opposed to anticipatory repudia-
tion. The likely practical result would be a political negotiation
between at least two of the states to decide which treaty would
prevail.
The Austro-German Customs Union Case,162 if decided under the
VCLT, would have similarly led to the split result of finding both
treaties effective among their respective parties.
The holding of the Oscar Chinn Case'63 favored the later treaty,
but did not address the issue of conflicts. The dissent, which did
address treaty conflicts, argued for an interpretation finding the
later treaty void ab initio. Once again, applying the VCLT would
lead to a different result, under the same logic as described in the
discussion of the San Juan River Case.
Aside from the reticent CACJ, the tribunals adjudicating these
early cases attempted to set forth a "final accounting" of which trea-
ties remained in power and which did not. While this rigid all-or-
nothing jurisprudence is disfavored today, it was admirable in its
attempt to describe a coherent set of rights and responsibilities
among the parties. Application of the VCLT would not have led to
such a result; rather, it would have involved an attempt to read
both treaties as applicable among their respective parties, creating
a need for renegotiation. The use of political means to sort out
legal issues, as seen in the San Juan River Case, is borne out in the
more recent cases.
162. See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying discussion.
163. See supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying discussion.
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2. Comparing and Contrasting the Old and New Incidents
The differences between the cases from the interwar period and
the more recent examples of treaty conflicts are striking. What gui-
dance can the interwar cases provide regarding the manner in
which current norms should evolve in order to account for increas-
ing levels of treaty congestion and conflict?
The early cases were the product of legalistic decisionmaking
before tribunals. It is important to note that these disputes actually
were resolved by tribunals, as opposed to negotiation between the
parties themselves. The cases that discussed treaty conflicts favored
the earlier treaty and found the later treaty void ab initio. Con-
versely, the Oscar Chinn majority, which did not explicitly consider
issues of treaty conflict, found that a later inter se agreement con-
trolled as between the parties. The dissenters, however, argued
that resolving an underlying treaty conflict was required for the
case, and thus they would have found the earlier treaty controlling.
Such reasoning is principled but relatively rigid. It does, however,
give the parties a strong sense of foreseeability: later-in-time trea-
ties on the same subject-matter will be void if they conflict with an
earlier treaty.
If recent incidents were resolved, they were not solved in court-
rooms, but rather through negotiations. The negotiated results
are not linked examinations or explications of legal principles such
as pacta sunt servanda or lex posterior. In the E.C. procurement
example, involving Germany's competing obligations to the United
States and subsequent obligations to the European Community,
the parties played a game of "chicken" in which they used trade
sanctions as threats to attempt to force each other to back down.
In the Caspian Sea example, Iran staked a legal claim but, for the
moment, at least, to no avail, particularly as the legal claim was
based on a time before the new littoral states involved even existed.
The modern style is political, flexible, and based on power at the
negotiating table-hoary legal principles hold little sway in the
hard bargaining. At the same time, there is little predictability as
to outcome; it is unclear which treaties will be honored and which
will not. Short of a full-blown renegotiation, there is little sense as
to the legal status of the parties. The modern style is more adapta-
ble and less legal, with little foreseeability.
Is this modern style necessarily a bad thing? Perhaps it is the
best possible outcome, as the objective is not to have all treaty con-
flicts adjudicated by a tribunal; the goal, rather, is to increase the
coherence of the system so that the treaties do not become individ-
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ually devalued due to a concern that they may not be respected
when perspectives on diplomacy change. Finding techniques that
make the likely outcome of a treaty conflict predictable at an ear-
lier time will allow for better decision-making and planning. More
generally, such predictability can bolster the idea that treaties are
part of a coherent international legal system. The challenge is to
maintain a certain amount of flexibility, which is clearly required
in today's politics, while simultaneouly increasing the predictability
of outcomes. The answer lies not in a place, such as a court to hear
more and more of these conflicts, nor in a rule, such as a rewritten
VCLT Article 30. Rather, the answer lies in a process. What is
required to address this problem is a series of standard procedures
ranging from drafting tools to interpretive techniques, as well as a
new understanding of what makes effective conflict rules. These
incidents illustrate that there is no single tool; therefore, we need a
toolbox full of options. Once there is clarity as to what those
options are and in what types of situations they are used, the pre-
dictability of outcomes will increase, thus protecting the value of
treaties.
To get a sense of which tools belong in this toolbox, it is helpful
to analogize from similar issues arising out of the law of contracts
and of statutory interpretation.
IV. ANALOGIES To OTHER TEXTUAL CONFLICTS: TREATY As
CONTRACT/TREATY As STATUTE
A. Alternate Paradigms of Resolving Treaty Conflicts
Treaties are often said to be functionally similar to domestic stat-
utes or contracts between private parties. For example, in the
realm of contracts, courts have determined the relationship of mul-
tiple contracts among an overlapping set of private parties.
Although the dominant analogy has historically been to contracts,
during the 1950s writers realized that analogies to legislation or
federalism may be fruitful in devising responses to the problems of
treaty conflicts.164 In the case of statutes, for example, we see two
modes of conflict resolution: (1) the use of canons of construction
to determine how to read the texts; and (2) applying rules con-
cerning the conflict of laws to determine if either law is better
suited for application than the other.
Such comparisons in legal reasoning concerning treaties are
endemic. However, the ILC's Fragmentation Study Group noted:
164. See, e.g., Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 406.
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There was also agreement that drawing analogies to the domes-
tic legal system may not always be appropriate. It was thought
that such analogies introduced a concept of hierarchy that is not
present on the international legal plane, and should not be
superimposed. It was suggested that there is no well-developed
and authoritative hierarchy of values in international law. In
addition, there is no hierarchy of systems represented by a final
body to resolve conflicts.
1 6 5
Thus, while treaties are in some respects similar to contracts and
in other respects more like legislation, one must keep in mind that
treaties are, in fact, sui generis and the solution to conflicting trea-
ties may draw from, but should not be cabined by, the techniques
used for resolving contractual or statutory conflicts.
1. Contractarian Approaches
Treaties are often described as contracts between states.1 66 This
approach has been particularly apparent in U.S. jurisprudence,
which often characterizes treaties in this manner.167 As the VCLT
is, in part, based on principles of contract law-stemming from
common law and civil law systems-it may be useful to look directly
165. Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 6.
166. See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 24, at 25. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMEN'TS, Introductory
Note (1987). Although the contractarian approach to analyzing the law of treaties has
many adherents and real advantages, one must nonetheless be cautious of overstressing
the analogy:
The international law of international agreements, indeed, is derived in substan-
tial part from general principles common to the contract laws of state legal sys-
tems, and international law may continue to draw on such principles.... But the
international law of international agreements has its own character, and analogies
from contract law of any particular country are to be used with caution. In many
respects there is no analogy in the law of international agreements to national
laws of contracts; for example, the law of international agreements knows no doc-
trine of consideration.., and no statute of frauds. Concepts of duress, mistake,
and fraud as grounds for voiding an international agreement have developed
slowly and differently.
Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, other systemic characteristics, such as the form and function of international
courts and tribunals, can affect what the members of the system agree upon as substantive
norms, as a "concept may be acceptable in national contract law where it is enforced by
impartial adjudication, but not in international law where there is often no effective means
of third party dispute resolution." Id.
167. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984) (stating
that "[a] treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations"); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v.
United States, 165 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that treaties are interpreted as
contracts between nations; as such, general rules of construction apply, including weight
given to the intent of parties); Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 457
(7th Cir. 1998) (stating that treaties are contracts subject to special rules of contract inter-
pretation); New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F.2d 847,
852 (2d Cir. 1992).
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to the principles of contract law in these traditions to consider
what techniques they may offer, by analogy, to solve the problem of
conflicting treaties. 168 As with our discussion of statutes, we will
consider both methods of contractual interpretation and possible
responses to conflicts between contracts. This latter topic will
center on the legal status of the second contract and, in particular,
will examine whether the second contract can be considered a
breach or an anticipatory repudiation of the first contract.
a. Contractual Interpretation and Party Intent
The dominant method of contract interpretation in the United
States is the plain meaning rule. 169 The essential idea of the rule is
that in some cases, the language, when taken in context, "is so clear
that evidence of prior negotiations cannot be used in its interpreta-
tion."'170 In practice, however, the plain meaning rule has been
liberalized to the point of considering evidence from past negotia-
tions-similar by analogy to travaux preparatoire--in the analysis to
determine whether or not the contractual language was clear. The
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts (Restatement) and
academic commentators have advocated an even greater use of
intent-based analysis of contractual meaning. This is not surpris-
ing, as the use of intentionalist reasoning is the norm in most legal
systems.
The construction of contracts in civil law countries is organized
around one of two premises: (1) that "it is the intention of the
promisor which counts," or (2) that "priority is given to the exter-
nal phenomenon of expression . . .the internal will of the prom-
168. International law generally looks to all major legal traditions in forming general
principles of law. Pre-VCLT general principles of the law of treaties, however, and the
VCLT itself were primarily influenced by the civil and common laws and we will draw pri-
marily from those wells in our search for greater understanding of the treaty norms.
Regarding other traditions, see, for example, Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract
Law: History, Development and a Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 153 (2001); Nabil
Saleh, The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 761 (1989).
169. ProfessorJoseph Perillo notes that "[a]lthough the Plain Meaning Rule has been
condemned by the writers, the UCC, the Restatement (Second) and an increasing number
of courts, the great majority of jurisdictions still employ the rule." JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CoNTRACrs 151 (5th ed. 1998) (citations omitted). Although
some scholars continue to distinguish "interpreting" a contract (finding the meaning of
the words) from "constructing" a contract (discerning the legal operation of the contract),
I will use the terms interchangeably, based on the same logic that Professor Farnsworth
had in his treatise: "This distinction between interpretation and construction is a difficult
one to maintain in practice and will not be stressed here." ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
453 (3d ed. 1999).
170. FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, at 476.
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isor is treated as significant only in so far as it coincides with the
normal objective meaning that a reasonable man would attribute
to its expression."' 17
1
The French Code, for example, emphasizes intention, rather
than the meaning of the words. Article 1156 of the Code states: "In
agreements it is necessary to search into the mutual intention of
the contracting parties, rather than to stop at the literal sense of
terms."1 7 2 Accordingly, the French Code focuses on a subjective
interpretation of contractual language. Nevertheless, the French
Code also "directs the judge to take account of objective factors,
for example, to interpret unclear terms so as to bring them in line
with the 'meaning of the contract' or 'usages' ....173
This evolution within, and the convergence among, legal systems
of contract doctrine lends support to the use of purposive reason-
ing in treaty interpretation, as will be discussed below.
b. Contractual Conflicts, Breach, and Anticipatory Repudiation
By way of analogy to the problem of conflicting treaties, consider
the following hypothetical situation under the different laws of
contracts: On January 1, A signs a contract to sell computers exclu-
sively to B as of February 1 (Contract I); on January 2, A agrees to
sell 100 computers to C at a certain price; C requires delivery by
March 1 (Contract II). The scenario is similar to potentially con-
flicting bilateral treaties with partial diversity of parties. Under
what conditions, if any, is Contract II a breach, repudiation, or an
anticipatory repudiation of Contract I?
Whether signing Contract II is a breach of Contract I would turn
on whether Contract I had terms explicitly forbidding the forma-
tion of Contract II. If Contract I provided that "A promises not to
enter into any sales contracts with C," then signing Contract II with
C would be a breach of Contract I. It is generally agreed under
U.S. law that a contract to break a contract is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy. 174 This hypothetical scenario described
at the beginning of this section, however, is a bit more nuanced.
171. KONRAD ZwEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 401
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. Oxford University Press 1998) (1977).
172. C. Civ. art. 1156 (Fr.); see also ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 171, at 402.
173. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 171, at 402; see also C. civ., arts. 1158, 1159 (Fr.).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 194 (1981). Moreover, "one who inten-
tionally and withoutjust cause induces another to commit a breach of contract with a third
person is guilty of a tort and is liable in damages to such third person." Grace McLane
Giesel, Bargains Inducing Breach of Contract with a Third Person, in 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 85.16 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2003).
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In Contract I, A promises to sell computers exclusively to B as of
February 1. In Contract II, A agrees to sell 100 computers on the
understanding that C requires delivery by March 1. It is not
entirely clear whether simply signing Contract II would be a breach
of Contract I. Depending on facts such as the actual date of deliv-
ery-before or after February 1-stronger or weaker cases can be
made as to whether performance is a breach. One would need to
examine the wording of Contract I and the intent of the parties in
forming it to discern whether entering into Contract II constituted
a breach, or if actual performance of Contract II would be
required.
One may also consider whether either making the second con-
tract or performing its obligations constituted some form of repu-
diation of the first contract. According to the Restatement, a
repudiation can be either (1) a statement that the obligor would
commit a breach that would give the other party the right to dam-
ages for a total breach; or (2) "a voluntary affirmative act which
renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform with-
out such a breach." 175
In this exclusive sales scenario, the central question is whether
merely signing Contract II would be a breach of Contract I, or
whether some other action is required for there to be a breach.
One response to this question is that signing Contract II would not
be sufficient to breach or repudiate Contract I and that actual per-
formance would be necessary. Another view, however, could be
based on the idea that Contract II would be an anticipatory repudi-
ation, also known as an anticipatory breach, of Contract I.
This first response is supported by the view that any statement
being used as an attempted repudiation "must be sufficiently posi-
tive to be reasonably understood as meaning that the breach will
actually occur .... In addition, the intention not to perform must
be communicated and must be made to a party to the contract, not
to a mere stranger to it. ' '176
This analysis focuses on Contract II as a communication of an
intent to breach Contract I. How that communication is made and
to whom determines, in part, whether a mere communication
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACS § 250 (1981); see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 169, at 605-06 ("A repudiation is a manifestation by one party to the other that the
first cannot or will not perform at least some of its obligations under the contract .... [T] o
have legal effect, the threatened breach ... must be serious enough that the injured party
could treat it as total if it occurred.").
176. FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, at 606.
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would be sufficient to rise to the level of a repudiation. In this
case, simply forming Contract II does not mean it will be communi-
cated directly by A to B (the party of Contract I). Yet, even if it
were, there could be doubt as to whether and how performance
would occur under Contract II. For example, A could choose to
breach Contract II. The result of this analysis is that both contracts
would be legally binding on A, and A would be in the position to
choose whether it would breach Contract I by performing Contract
ILI.
Regardless of whether making a shipment to C or another third
party prior to February 1 would constitute a breach of A's obliga-
tions to B under Contract I, and so long as making Contract II
itself was not a breach of Contract I, the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) allows B to seek an assurance from A that A will per-
form its duties under Contract I. The failure by A to give such an
assurance could be treated by B as a repudiation of Contract 1.177
Thus, while there may be ambiguity as to which contract would
survive, there is a technique-the demand for assurance-that can
help resolve the issue relatively quickly.
The second line of reasoning is that Contract II would be an
anticipatory repudiation of Contract I. This result is based on the
assumption that the second contract would in some way decrease
the value of the first contract by calling its expected benefit into
question. In this analysis, the issue is not whether Contract II is
actually performed, but whether the risk of Contract II's perform-
ance causes one to discount the value of Contract I. For example,
if B, the obligee of Contract I, wanted to sell his rights under Con-
tract I to D, D's pricing of Contract I would likely be lower in light
of the existence of Contract II.
Underpinning this view is that signing Contract II would not
merely be repudiation by words, but an act. Moreover, a "prom-
isor's voluntary affirmative act that renders the promisor actually
or apparently unable to perform without a breach is a repudia-
tion." 78 The Restatement seems to support this opinion as the
proper reading of a conflict between two contracts, offering the
following example:
On April 1, A contracts to sell and B to buy land, delivery of the
deed and payment of the price to be on July 30 .... A says
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251.
178. FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, at 607.
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nothing to B on May 1, but on that date he contracts to sell the
land to C. A's making the contract with C is a repudiation. 179
In such a case, the injured party would have a claim of damages
for total breach and would not have to perform under Contract
1.180
Returning to our scenario of the computer sales contracts, Ger-
man and Swiss law in particular have a rule similar to anticipatory
breach in the doctrine of "positive breach of contract" (positive
Forderungsverletzung). A positive breach can occur when a promisor
"unequivocally evinces his intention not to perform."'' This could
include, for example, a vendor shipping goods to a third party,
contrary to an exclusivity promise. The application of this rule
where there has been actual performance under the second con-
tract is clear-whether it would apply as well at the mere signing of
the contract is more ambiguous.
To determine whether the mere existence of Contract II
breaches Contract I, it is necessary to focus on the intent of the
parties. When contractual language is clear, intent is found rela-
tively easily. In cases such as the computer sales scenario, a more
involved analysis of intent and prior negotiations would likely be
necessary. The law of contracts, however, has made clear that,
aside from scenarios where Contract II is a breach of Contract I,
there may also be instances in which Contract II is an anticipatory
repudiation of Contract I. In either case, a proper analysis would
require an appreciation of the goal or purpose of Contract I and
whether Contract II frustrates the expectation of Contract I's bene-
fit. This supports, by analogy, the sense that in considering possi-
ble treaty conflicts, the heart of the matter is not whether treaties
have the same subject-matter, but whether one treaty disrupts the
intended operation of the other.
c. Comparison to the VCLT and the Limits of the
Contractarian Analogy
Although there are many points of comparison between treaties
and contracts on the issue of textual conflicts, there are three core
lessons to be drawn from this discussion: (1) the importance of
intent in textual interpretation; (2) anticipatory repudiation as a
useful legal framework for considering treaty conflicts; and (3) the
role of assurance.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250, illus. 1, 5.
180. FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, at 607-08.
181. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 171, at 493.
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The first lesson of domestic contract law is the general evolution
and convergence of methods of contractual interpretation around
the idea of intent. The story of contractual interpretation is one in
which the intent of the parties--tempered by certain external stan-
dards such as reasonableness and context of the transaction-is
generally accepted as a useful, and often necessary, technique of
contractual interpretation. Civil law systems have generally been
open to examining the intent of the parties, and have also
accepted the addition of objective standards. In common law
countries, rules of interpretation-such as the plain meaning rule
of the United States-have undergone a process of liberalization to
allow, in certain instances, evidence of negotiations to be used in
the first-stage inquiry into the clarity of the contract's language.
The Restatement, for example, allows for the use of the intent of
the parties. With the exclusion of certain countries, such as the
United Kingdom, there seems to be a general acceptance of the
use of some form of intent-based interpretation of contractual
meaning. These developments argue in favor of greater use of
purposivist reasoning in the interpretation of treaty texts when ana-
lyzing a real or potential treaty conflict.
The second main insight of domestic contract law is the role of
anticipatory repudiation. In relation to the conflicting contracts
scenario, common law countries-and to a certain extent the Ger-
manic civil law systems-embrace the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation. The VCLT does not explicitly refer to this doctrine.
Article 60, concerning the termination or suspension of a treaty
due to its breach, defines a material breach as "[a] repudiation of
the treaty not sanctioned by the [VCLT]; or a violation of a provi-
sion essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of
the treaty."18 2
Much attention has focused on whether the law on treaties
encompasses a norm of anticipatory breach: "In other words, [can]
a state . . .violate a treaty simply by creating a conflicting obliga-
tion, or [must it] actually fail to perform?" 18 3 Current analysis does
182. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 60(3). A material breach has different effects under a
bilateral or a multilateral treaty. Under a bilateral treaty, it gives the injured party or par-
ties the option to terminate or suspend the operation of the treaty. 1 OPPENHEIM INERNA-
TIONAL LAw 1301-02 (RobertJennings and Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM (NINTH)]. Such termination can occur in a multilateral treaty when there is
unanimous agreement (but for the breaching party); short of a unanimous agreement to
terminate, the parties may suspend the operation of the treaty. VCLT, supra note 13, art.
60(2); see also OPPENHEIM (NINTH), at 1302.
183. BINDER, supra note 59, at 28.
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not address the problem of treaty conflicts in these terms; as such it
is not a developed norm. Based on analogies from the domestic
cases of contractual conflicts, however, the idea of anticipatory
repudiation is a useful one, as it focuses attention on the underly-
ing goals of each treaty. This, in turn, urges a more systematic
inquiry into the interrelationship of treaties.
A third lesson learned from domestic contract laws is the role
that assurance can play in clarifying the legal status of agreements.
This is essentially what Costa Rica sought from Nicaragua when it
first learned of the secret treaty between Nicaragua and the United
States. Upon receiving Nicaragua's refusal to give any assurance,
Costa Rica did not pursue the isse; under a regime closer to con-
tract law-especially U.S. contract law-failure to give an assurance
would amount to a repudiation of the contract. Thus, if a norm of
assurance were formalized in international relations, potential con-
flicts could be clarified expeditiously by countries effectively being
asked to choose between (1) assuring that they would not break
their obligations under Treaty I; (2) refusing to give an assurance
and thus repudiating-essentially denouncing or possibly breach-
ing-Treaty I; or (3) realizing that a conflict exists and offering to
renegotiate with one or more treaty partners. Such "standard
operating procedures" can play an important role in clarifying rela-
tionships absent the existence of a neutral third-party dispute reso-
lution body, such as an international tribunal.
2. Analogies to Domestic Statutory Interpretation and Conflicts
General principles of treaty interpretation have been drawn
from methods of statutory interpretation in addition to the law of
contracts. The proliferation of multilateral treaties in particular
has led to a reassessment of the contracts analogy:
[W] e are no longer faced with a conflict between two contracts
concluded by one state vis-d-vis two different states, but two sub-
systems, binding on all states involved, under which contradic-
tory law was made. The best domestic law analogy may be that
of two legislators, each creating contradictory laws.184
While most general principles of international law were defined
in the early twentieth century, norms of domestic statutory inter-
pretation have continued to evolve significantly. Domestic statu-
tory interpretation, therefore, provides a model against which one
may compare the current norms of treaty interpretation and assess
whether the international norms have evolved in a manner similar
184. PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 18.
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to their domestic counterparts. As domestic legal systems have
increased in complexity, how has statutory interpretation evolved
and what lessons can be applied to treaty interpretation?
a. Statutory Interpretation and Conflict
As in the case of contractual interpretation, methods of statutory
interpretation in the United States have evolved from simply using
the plain meaning of the text, to interpreting the language based
on an analysis of the underlying goal or purpose of the statute.
The plain meaning rule was commonly used in the United States
prior to the 1940s; in Caminetti v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court gave a classic explanation of the rule:
[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the
final expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added
to or subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or
designating names or reports accompanying their introduction,
or from any extraneous source. In other words, the language
being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable
consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative
intent.18 5
This definition points to the very weakness of the rule: when the
meanings of words are not "free from doubt," then the plain mean-
ing rule is simply used to justify whichever definition the court
chooses to apply.186
Today, statutory interpretation in the United States often turns
on an analysis of the goals of the legislature in enacting a certain
law. These analyses have focused on ideas such as legislative
"intent" or "purpose," terms with definitions that "have not been
applied consistently." 18 7 The doctrines of intent and purpose are
generally distinguished in that "lawyers tend to identify the imme-
diate legislative purpose with 'legislative intent' and reserve the
term 'legislative purpose' for any broader or remote ('ulterior')
legislative purpose."188
185. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917); see also Arthur W. Murphy,
Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern"
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1300 (1975); OroJ. HETZEL et al., LEGISLATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 405 (2d ed. 1993).
186. HETZEL et al., supra note 185, at 392, 700-02 (citing J.W. HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES (1982)).
187. Id. at 392.
188. F. Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek at the Mind and the Will of a Legisla-
ture, 50 IND. L.J. 206, 224 (1975).
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Intentionalism is probably the most commonly used method of
statutory interpretation in the United States.189 Intent is discerned
through the use of legislative history-a method that has had any-
thing but a quiet history in legal academia and practice.1 90
Some argue, however, that purposivism, as opposed to intention-
alism, is now the general theory of statutory interpretation.'9l
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks formulated purposivism in
such a manner to suggest that as "every statute.., has some kind of
purpose or objective," so (in Eskridge's paraphrase)"ambiguities
can... be intelligently resolved, first, by identifying that purpose
and the policy or principles it embodies, and then by deducing the
result most consonant with that principle or policy."192 The tech-
nique of purposivism-use of legislative history-is similar to that
of intentionalism and likewise falls victim to the same criticisms of
indeterminacy. Recent criticisms have also used public choice the-
ory and interest group theory to argue that the interrelationship of
rational legislators and interest groups does not lead to purposive
statutes but rather to legislation that distributes benefits to well
organized groups.193
Looking to the norms of other legal systems, "[i]f there were a
Restatement of International Statutory Interpretation, the main
rule would be that ordinary meaning of the statutory language (or
in appropriate cases, the technical meaning of the word) prevails
except under special circumstances."194 The disagreement
between systems is centered around defining these special circum-
stances. The use of legislative history is a particular flashpoint.
'Jurisdictions seem evenly split about whether the 'plain' meaning
189. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea-
soning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 325 (1990).
190. William N. Eskridge,Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 624, 676 (1990)[hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism]. The recent critiques by Justice Scalia are per-
haps the best known indictments of the use of legislative history, a process which Charles
Curtis called "fumbling about the ashcans of the legislative process for the shoddiest
unenacted expressions of intention." Richard I. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and
the Use of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Re-Examination, 9
CAL. W. L. Rv. 128, 131 (1972) (quoting Charles Curtis); see also HETZEL et al., supra note185, at 439. The central dilemma is the indeterminacy in fixing a single intent for a group
of legislators. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 189, at 326.
191. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 189, at 333.
192. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth Century Statu-
tory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1731, 1743 (1993) (citations omitted).193. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 189, at 334-35; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988).
194. Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Per-
spective, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 513, 517 (1996) (reviewing INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991)).
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can be overridden by especially strong evidence of legislative
intent."195 Neil MacCormick and Robert Summers note that this
division is not apparent when comparing common law and civil law
countries.
b. Statutory Conflicts and Clashing Canons
Courts have used canons of construction to sort out many of
these interpretive issues. However, as Karl Llewellyn wrote in an
influential article on statutory interpretation in 1950, "there are
two opposing canons on almost every point."196 Llewellyn's article
sets out a series of "thrusts"-theses of statutory interpretation-
that were replied by "parries"-equally accepted anti-theses of
interpretation. For example, one canon states that "[a] statute can-
not go beyond its text," while another argues that "[t]o effect its
purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text."'
197 This
conflict is analogous to one of the problems with treaty interpreta-
tion-the varied conflicting general principles of construction,
which lead to indeterminacy of outcomes.
Numerous canons pertain to statutory conflicts. Perhaps the
most commonly noted cannon states that the last-enacted statute
controls over previously enacted statutes. 198 Another-the pur-
pose rule-states that one should "interpret ambiguous statutes so
as to best carry out their statutory purposes."'199 Yet another canon
requires that the specific control the general. 200 This latter canon
is the domestic origin of the international version of lex specialis.
Additionally, in light of the VCLT's same subject-matter clause, it
should also be noted that the in pari mateyia rule, which states that
"similar statutes should be interpreted similarly, unless legislative
purpose and history suggests material differences." 20
1 Note that
both the purpose rule and the in pari materia rule specifically men-
195. Id. at 518.
196. See note 59 and accompanying text.
197. Llewellyn, supra note 59, at 401.
198. HETZEL et al., supra note 185, at 600-06.
199. WILLiAM N. ESKRIDGE et al., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 381
(2000) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION].
200. See Presher v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973).
201. ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 199, at 381. But see Llewellyn, who viewed this
formulation as two opposing canons: "[s]tatutes in pari materia must be construed
together;" and "[a] statute is not in pai materia if its scope and aim are distinct or where a
legislative design to depart from the general purpose or policy of previous enactments may
be apparent." Llewellyn, supra note 59, at 402. Llewellyn's formulation, it should be
noted, is from an earlier article whereas the Eskridge formulation is from a more recent
piece assessing how the U.S. Supreme Court applied canons from its 1986 through 1993
terms.
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tion discerning the purpose of the statute in question. We see,
therefore, that although mechanistic rules such as the last-in-time
rule-lex posterior-are used to resolve domestic statutory conflicts,
in the United States there is also an accepted use of purposive anal-
ysis to decide: (1) whether statutes are similar, and (2) how to
interpret ambiguous language. The former is of particular inter-
est, given the manner in which the same subject-matter clause has
been used as a method to determine whether there is a treaty
conflict.
In contrast, practice in the United Kingdom is rooted in the text,
with a bias against the use of outside sources or purposivist inter-
pretation. As one commentator noted:
American courts never followed the British practice of forbid-
ding any resort to legislative history, and even under the plain
meaning rule there were many ways in which a court could look
at legislative history, if it wanted to-by characterizing words as
"ambiguous," by finding that their plain meaning led to
"absurd" results, or by using extrinsic aids to "confirm" the plain
meaning.20 2
c. Comparison to the VCLT
The primary technique of treaty interpretation, as defined by
VCLT Article 31, is textual. The first Paragraph states that "[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object or purpose." 203 The context
for such interpretation includes other agreements made in connec-
tion with the conclusion of the treaty and considers, among other
things, any subsequent agreements concerning the interpretation
of the treaty or subsequent practice concerning treaty application
as well as relevant rules of international law.20 4
While treaties are to be interpreted to effect their purposes, pur-
pose is assumed to be clear from the plain meaning of the text. If
it is not, then as a subsidiary means of reasoning, one may turn to
travaux preparatoire, the international analog of legislative history.
International lawyers can learn from the the manner in which
domestic lawyers use purposivist reasoning as a tool to discern
when statutes are in pan' materia. This technique places the pur-
pose of the statute at the center of the inquiry. This technique is
202. Murphy, supra note 185, at 1301.
203. VCLT, supra note 13, art. 31(1).
204. Id. arts. 31(2), 31(3).
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easily contrasted with the formalist misapplication of the same-sub-
ject rule seen in international law-if two treaties by their terms are
not about the same subject, then they do not conflict. This is the
reasoning of the new littoral states in the Caspian Sea Treaties, as
well as in Wold's argument comparing SPAW and CITES. Such for-
malism misses the point: The specific words in the text are not the
issue; the issue is the frustration of the treaty's purpose. Purposivist
statutory reasoning asks whether, beyond formalist results, the aims
of two potentially conflicting statutes concern the same subject.
Applying purposivist reasoning to treaty conflicts, the inquiry
becomes whether two treaties have the same, or similar, purposes.
The inquiry then shifts to whether one treaty frustrates the purpose
of another treaty, regardless of whether or not they seem to relate
to the same subject-matter. Bringing purposivism forward as an
interpretive tool furthers the description of how treaties actually
affect one another in practice.
d. Conclusion: Statutory Analogy
The disagreement between different legal systems over the role
of purposivism partially explains why it is not more prevalent in the
international sphere. It is not the most widely-accepted technique
with which to address problems of statutory construction. Yet,
regardless of how many states currently use purposivist reasoning
in their domestic statutory interpretation, this technique provides
certain distinct advantages when used in the area of treaty
conflicts.
3. Analogies to Statutes and Contracts: General Conclusions
Similarities exist in how the doctrines of contractual and statu-
tory interpretation have evolved. Both began as being primarily-
if not solely-concerned with the plain meaning of the text. How-
ever, increasing complexity and ambiguity have led to an evolution
in each of these areas toward giving greater weight to the intent of
the parties and the use of external evidence, such as related writ-
ings and legislative history.
Treaty interpretation, by contrast, is still relatively textual.
Although itself a proposition open to controversy and criticism, the
use of travaux preparatoire in treaty interpretation is more controver-
sial than the use of legislative history in domestic statutory interpre-
tation. Allowing for more purposive interpretation, however, can
lead to a more finely-tuned approach to resolving treaty conflicts
by increasing awareness of when one treaty may actually frustrate
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the purpose of another. Accordingly, both contract drafters and
legislators aim to avoid textual conflicts, in part by being mindful
of the texts and the purposes of other statutes and contracts. This
will be further discussed in relation to treaties in Part V, below.
The laws of legislation and contracts differ, however, in terms of
possible solutions to existing textual conflicts. Excluding situations
involving clauses of priority, a broad range of canons of construc-
tion is utilized by courts to resolve legislative conflicts. Particularly
because some of these statutes may differ from areas of domestic
regulation, and because the various canons of construction can
contradict each other, it is important to have access to a competent
court of general jurisdiction that can both analyze the conflicting
texts and choose from among the possible canons in a manner
which would be deemed procedurally and substantively fair by all
the parties.
Contractual conflicts are often resolved by the parties them-
selves, without judicial involvement. Finding litigation to be too
time consuming and costly, parties may instead rely on background
rules, such as those described in the Restatement or the UCC, to
provide a sense of their relative rights and thereby frame any nego-
tiation. Norms such as anticipatory repudiation and the practice of
assurance set out procedures and default rules that allow parties to
resolve conflicts in a principled manner, should they wish to do so.
Moreover, they provide a level of foreseeability as to the likely out-
come if a negotiated result is not achieved and the parties resort to
litigation or arbitration. The importance for states to be able to
resolve treaty conflicts without resorting to third-party dispute reso-
lution-which either may not exist or may be particularly time-con-
suming-makes this analogy particularly relevant.
Based on these analogies and in light of the earlier examples, it
is now possible to set out the various tools and practices that would
be useful in attempting to minimize the frequency and severity of
treaty conflicts.
V. FROM CONFLICTS To COHERENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Tools and Techniques for Resolving Treaty Conflicts
Implicit in the critique of the current state of the treaty conflicts
doctrine is the issue that black-letter rules are only of nominal use
in practice. As the United Nations recognized in the Final Clauses
of Multilateral Treaty Handbook, VCLT Article 30 "may not be suffi-
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cient to address all the problems arising with respect to the priority
of the application of a particular treaty."20 5 Ad hoc negotiation is
more prevalent than consistent application of Article 30. Perhaps
even more worrisome than inconsistent application of Article 30 is
that, in this era of treaty proliferation and congestion, there has
been no in-depth consideration of the application of treaty conflict
rules by an international court or other international institution
since the 1930s.
It may well be that the international community would prefer to
address rules of treaty conflict through political negotiations with-
out being bound by fixed rules. However, if the project of interna-
tional lawyers is to foster coherence among the sources of
international law, then some form of strategy is necessary to
address the manner in which the structure of international law has
changed.
The various examples and doctrinal considerations suggest seven
tools and techniques that may be especially promising: (1) revising
how states decide which conflicts are worthy of attention; (2) using
treaty drafting to avoid potential conflicts; (3) using purposivist
interpretation more frequently; (4) using assurance in an
expanded and more formalized manner; (5) institutionalizing safe-
guards against treaty conflicts; (6) incorporating better back-
ground rules for instances where safeguards and other techniques
are not effective; and (7) refining the processes states use to build
the international legal system.
1. Discerning Relevant from Irrelevant Conflicts
The VCLT attempts to solve conflicts between treaties with the
same subject-matter. While this is useful in certain instances, it
does not apply to the problems of greatest concern today. In 1953
Jenks argued for an understanding of treaty conflicts broader than
simply a same subject-matter test, contending that if treaties "deal
with related questions or have repercussions upon one another in
any other way," there is the "possibility of conflict." 20 6 Of signifi-
cant concern are subsequent treaties, regardless of professed sub-
ject-matter, that frustrate the purpose of preexisting treaties. In
such cases, the political goals of state parties are inhibited by their
own actions and, on a more abstract level, such conflicts under-
mine the structural role of treaties within the international system.
205. MULTILATERAL TREAThY HANDBOOK, supra note 108, at 86.
206. Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 404.
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Whether or not these treaties happen to have the "same subject-
matter" is less important than the effects of the treaties themselves
and how those effects relate to the underlying purpose of the trea-
ties. For example, treaties concerning the protection of the rights
of groups of people "may tend to cut across the provisions of
instruments dealing with particular subjects or problems. '" 20 7 Such
treaties are probably not concerned with the same subject-matter.
Jenks's concern, therefore, stems from the actual results of such
treaty provisions rather than their expressed subject-matter.
2. Drafting Treaties to Avoid Conflicts
Of course, the best type of conflict avoidance takes place in the
drafting stage, as is evinced by Article 30(2) of the VCLT. Com-
mentators have highlighted the importance of clauses of abroga-
tion or precedence, though their effectiveness depends on how
well they are drafted. In 1945 Jenks wrote that "[t] he existence of a
manual of common forms for standard articles could give a great
stimulus to the adoption of suggestions designed to remedy the
characteristic shortcomings of the technique of international legis-
lation by means of the multipartite instrument."208 Nearly a decade
later he lamented that "[t] he technical legal equipment necessary
to give a picture of the international statute book as a whole is still
defective in the extreme." 20 9 This defect is still in need of remedy.
Perhaps of greatest use are the Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaty
Handbook, published by the United Nations, and The Treaty Maker's
Handbook, published by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, both
of which collect examples of different types of conflict avoidance
clauses. 210 While these collections can help novice drafters get a
sense of current and then-current practices, there is an underlying
problem: standard practice does not result in adequately compre-
hensive treaty avoidance clauses.
Since the VCLT focuses on treaties covering the same subject-
matter, and the VCLT's conflict rules mentioning such clauses are
under the rubric of successive treaties on the same-subject-matter,
such clauses tend to be narrowly written, looking only to previous
treaties that seem directly related. Yet, as we have seen, the main
207. Id. at 415.
208. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Need for an International Legislative Drafting Bureau, 39 Am. J.
INT'L L. 163, 175 (1945) [hereinafterJenks, Legislative DraftingBureau].
209. Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 431.
210. See generally MULTILATERAL TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 108; THE TREATY
MAKER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 35.
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area of current concern in treaty conflicts is the effect of treaties
with different subjects but overlapping areas of concern. Savings
clauses that take into account this broader perspective are more
likely to anticipate and avoid a greater number of possible future
conflicts. This technique requires negotiators to think of the inter-
national legal system as a web of related agreements that can affect
one another. This system may require treaty parties to consult with
parties to other treaty regimes to which their states already belong,
but the positive results are twofold.
First, not only will this technique prevent conflicts, but it will
also have the salutary effect of spurring international lawyers, who
profess to be working within an international legal system, to more
carefully consider the shape and operation of that system as a
whole. This is essential if international law is to operate as a true
legal system. Mutual consultation by international organizations
prior to the submission of draft conventions for ratification has
been suggested as one important step.211
Jenks further argued that:
Invaluable as is much of this literature on special subjects, it
does not fill the need for an international equivalent of Hals-
bury's Laws of England describing comprehensively in the con-
text of the previous law the content of the whole body of law-
making treaties now in force for any considerable number of
parties. Even the texts currently in force are not conveniently
available. Matters of this kind are too easily dismissed as of sec-
ondary importance, but they have a direct practical bearing on
the quality of the craftsmanship which can be brought to the
improvement of the international statute book.2
12
In the age of digital communications, progress has been made
with regard to the growth of networked databases and search
engines geared towards the dissemination of information about
treaties.213 Nevertheless, it still remains that too few comprehen-
sive resources are used too infrequently at the drafting stage.
Some may argue that these issues can be addressed by recogniz-
ing a formal hierarchy among treaties. This proposal could be
achieved by amending the VCLT to allow for default rules of hier-
archy. Such default rules may favor, for example, law-making or
quasi-constitutional treaties-, such as the U.N. Charter, the Rome
Treaty of the EC, or the GATT-over more narrowly defined or
211. SeeJenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 430.
212. Id. at 431.
213. See, e.g., EISIL, supra note 101.
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"contractual" treaties. 214 The interpretive debate under this norm
would then become whether a certain treaty was "law-making" or
not. This strategy, however, has some significant weaknesses. For
example, it ignores that there is an ever-increasing number of law-
making regimes and, as such, a growing risk of conflicts among
them.
Furthermore, such a formal, systemic hierarchization of treaties
may in fact clash with the VCLT. As one writer concluded:
Confidence in international intercourse requires certainty of
compliance with any juridical commitment. Therefore, as a
rule, there cannot be any hierarchic superiority between trea-
ties. Any exception to this rule touches on a cornerstone of
international law, as it tampers with the rule pacta sunt servanda.
The superiority of a given treaty should be clearly manifested.
Rules to this effect, especially Article 103 of the UN Charter,
should be strictly interpreted. 215
This criticism is based on the concern that hierarchization would
decrease state parties' confidence in a treaty remaining effective
with the force of law, as a hierarchically superior later-in-time
treatycould trump a lower-ranked treaty. This concern could be
minimized if, rather than adopting some general scheme of hier-
archization throughout the international system, states made
greater use of clauses of priority. Such clauses should enumerate
related prior treaties and explicitly state that the current treaty is
hierarchically superior or inferior to each prior treaty. Such a
strategy is already used in various treaty regimes, but a more thor-
ough analysis of potential conflicts during the time of treaty negoti-
ation could lead to more comprehensive clauses of abrogation or
precedence. Using a purposive analysis of treaties would be espe-
cially useful in the drafting of such clauses, as it would include the
broadest number of potentially conflicting treaties. The drafter
could then make a clearer decision as to which treaties should in
fact be primary in relation to the new treaty. This practice would
assist in subsequent treaty interpretation and aversion of conflicts.
3. Interpretation to Spot and Stop Conflicts
But what of existing treaties? As previously mentioned, one of
the troubling aspects of treaty conflicts is the deafening silence of
international tribunals. Due to the "generally accepted" presump-
214. Note how, in some instances, this would effectively reverse the canonical principal
of lex specialis.
215. Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Hierarchy of Treaties, in EssAys ON THE LAW OF TREATIES:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF BERT VIERDAG 7, 18 (Jan Klabbers & Ren6 Lefeber eds., 1988).
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tion against a conflict of norms, "the state relying on a conflict of
norms will have the burden of proving it."216 Pauwelyn discusses,
as an example, the EC-Hormones case before the WTO, where the
Dispute Settlement Board stated that "WTO members, as sovereign
entities, can be presumed to act in conformity with their WTO obli-
gations. A party claiming that a Member acted inconsistently with
WATO rules bears the burden of proving that inconsistency. '" 217
While this practice describes the allocation of burdens in formal
judicial proceedings, it is in the interest of negotiators to be cau-
tious and to assume that clauses that may conflict will conflict, and
thus they should utilize clear conflict avoidance devices such as
clauses of abrogation or precedence and third party agreements.
Perhaps even more troubling is how cases that would seem to
conflict are read out of existence by the application of the same
subject-matter clause from VCLT Article 30. In this manner, Arti-
cle 30 plays a role for which it was not meant-rather than simply
being read to describe the rules to apply for certain types of con-
flicts, it is being used to support the argument that because these
treaties are not concerned with the same subject-matter, no con-
flict exists between them.
Resolving such conflicts requires bringing the ideas of intent and
purpose to the foreground in matters of treaty construction. As
Pauwelyn wrote, 'Jenks's call for negotiators to 'form the habit of
regarding proposed new instruments from the standpoint of their
effect on the international statute book as a whole' has not always
been heard."218  Discerning intent or purpose from travaux
preparatoire in international treaty-making poses certain daunting
challenges. Many of these challenges can be addressed, however,
by considering the domestic processes and techniques of statutory
construction.
It is important to keep in mind that while treaty interpretation
under international law is used only as a matter of definition, one
may not go beyond the "clear meaning" of the words.219 Interpre-
tation cannot make a conflict disappear.
[I]f interpretation leads to the conclusion that one norm in and
of itself, or as implemented or relied upon by a state, does consti-
216. PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 240.
217. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones) para. 9, WT/DS26/ARB (Decision by the WTO Arbitrators on European Commu-
nities, July 12, 1999).
218. PAuwELYN, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting Jenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11,
at 452).
219. Id. at 245-46.
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tute a breach of another norm, that is where the role of inter-
pretation of treaty terms as a conflict-avoidance technique stops.
To put it differently, interpretation of the terms in question may
resolve apparent conflicts; it cannot resolve genuine conflicts. 2 20
4. Assurance
Although interpretation alone cannot resolve a conflict, the par-
ties themselves are able to do so. Accordingly, where a party has
interpreted the texts of the treaties and believes there is a potential
conflict, the first step should be to seek assurance. In a potential
AB:AC conflict-in which A and B have formed Treaty I and A and
C have formed Treaty II-if B is concerned with whether A will
honor its obligations, B should seek assurance from A that A does
not intend to breach its obligations under Treaty I. The process of
assurance-seeking may cause A to notice a potential conflict of
which it had not previously been aware, and thus gives A, B, and C
the opportunity to negotiate a solution among themselves. If A
does not believe there is any potential conflict, then B's request
affords A and B the opportunity to discuss what is clearly a diver-
gent interpretation of their treaty. If A gives B the requested assur-
ance, then B can feel relatively confident that Treaty I will be
honored.
If, however, A refuses to give assurance, B may view this refusal as
an act giving B the right to terminate its obligations under Treaty I
without incurring any state responsibility even if A has not actually
breached. Under such a regime, Costa Rica would have been able
to immediately withdraw from the Cafias-Jerez Treaty once Nicara-
gua refused to give any assurance. Such a default rule would give
the parties a better sense of their relative positions and facilitate
any re-negotiation by providing them with a common understand-
ing of the legal context. Thus, making assurance-seeking a stan-
dard procedure in international relations would facilitate the
resolution of potential conflicts by the parties themselves.
5. Institutionalized Safeguards
Another technique is to establish certain safeguard procedures
within international institutions. For example, Rosenne suggested
that a possible solution concerning the UNCLOS scenario would
be to assign a monitoring role to the U.N. Secretary-General, due
to his double role as depositary of UNCLOS specifically, and in the
220. Id. at 272.
[Vol. 37
Resolving Treaty Conflicts
registration and publication of treaties more generally, under Arti-
cle 102 of the U.N. Charter.22'
Similarly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has been
tasked with coordinating the efforts of U.N. specialized agencies.
Article 63(2) of the UN Charter gives ECOSOC the responsibility
to "coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through
consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and rec-
ommendations to the General Assembly and the Members of the
United Nations."222
The Review of Multilateral Treaty-Making Process submitted to the
General Assembly in 1980 noted the administrative procedures
that parties used to avoid conflicts. The International Labour
Organization, for example, "developed a particularly careful prac-
tice of identifying [conflicting] treaties, including both those
within its own organization and those concluded or under consid-
eration outside, about which information is received pursuant to
[information-sharing arrangements between international organi-
zations organized by the United Nations]."223
While institutional safeguards may be a helpful addition to our
growing catalog of responses to treaty conflicts and legal fragmen-
tation, one should not put too much emphasis on any one tool.
Rosenne believes that while administrative procedures can be use-
ful, "their role must not be exaggerated. '" 224 Conflicts will persist.
6. Background Rules
Recognizing that conflicts will persist, policymakers need to
establish some elemental rules to undergird the treaty-making
process.
a. Good Faith and Clean Hands
Good faith is a critical element of all aspects of international
law. 225 Concerning treaty conflicts, good faith is especially relevant
regarding whether the parties to a later conflicting treaty knew of
the existence of an earlier conflicting treaty at the time the later
treaty was concluded. The need for good faith is particularly stark
221. ROSENNE, supra note 98, at 90.
222. U.N. CHARTER art. 63(2).
223. Analytical Review of the Process: Report of the Secretaiy-General, para. 49, U.N. Doc. A/
35/312 (1980), revised by U.N. Doc. A/35/312/Corr. 1 (1980).
224. Rosenne, supra note 98, at 95.
225. See, e.g., VCLT, supra note 13, art. 31(1) ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith[.]").
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when there is a diversity of parties between the two treaties
(AB:AC). If C subsequently seeks enforcement of A's obligations
under Treaty II, that would conflict with A's obligations under
Treaty I. At issue, in part, is "C's good faith in [making Treaty II],
which depends inter alia on C's knowledge of treaty AB." 226 If C
knew of the earlier conflicting treaty, then it should not be able to
rely on VCLT Article 30(4) to enforce Treaty II, as such a result
would reward C's bad faith at B's expense. Rather, the interna-
tional system should clarify that the norm of good faith prohibits a
state from invoking the VCLT or general principles such as lex pos-
terior when acting in bad faith.
b. Anticipatory Repudiation.
Commentators agree that if a later-in-time treaty is prohibited by
an earlier treaty, then the conclusion of the later treaty is a breach
of the earlier, and depending on the circumstances, may rise to the
level of being a material breach. 227 The more difficult issue is
when the later treaty is not explicitly prohibited by the earlier
treaty. Drawing from contract law, international law should recog-
nize a doctrine of anticipatory repudiation where the act of negoti-
ating and concluding a treaty that would frustrate the purpose of
an earlier treaty may be viewed as a repudiation of that earlier
treaty. In such a case, conclusion of the later treaty would consti-
tute an act of material breach and give rise to issues of state
responsibility.
7. Role for Soft Law228
Finally, it is possible that one of the techniques that will alleviate
the problem of future treaty conflicts will emanate not from a
canon of construction, a hierarchization of treaties, or a new clause
within treaties. Rather, this term may emanate from the increased
use of so-called "soft law."
The term soft law refers to instruments that, although not legally
binding, can play a part in the creation of a norm. Corporate
codes of conduct, joint declarations after diplomatic conferences,
and "gentlemen's agreements" between countries are examples of
226. Vierdag, supra note 109, at 94.
227. See, e.g., ROSENNE, supra note 98, at 85.
228. I am indebted to Peggy McGuinness of the University of Missouri at Columbia for
suggesting this line of inquiry.
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soft law instruments, 229 which tend to be used to a greater degree
in the spheres of environmental and human rights policy than in
national security or military affairs.
230
Soft law may provide a means for states to build a consensus on a
new regime prior to formalizing a treaty. As this new regime is
refined through soft law instruments such as declarations, white
papers, and gentlemen's agreements, states will be able to analyze
the relationship of the nascent regime to current treaties in force.
As they are not legally binding, soft law norms are relatively easy to
adjust and allow for a period of trial and error. This interval of soft
law would allow states to clarify and address potential conflicts
through a variety of means, including reconsideration of how to
draft any forthcoming treaty on the subject, or how to promulgate
optional protocols-perhaps including savings clauses or similar
language-under existing treaties to address possible crises.
This soft law process would stand in contrast to the working
group scenario which has dominated the drafting of numerous
recent multilateral treaties, and the political negotiations in sub-
ject-specific committees building towards a final text. While these
latter techniques can lead to achieving hard bargains and techni-
cally precise language, they can also be akin to running while wear-
ing blinders: you are focused on your goal, but fail to notice what is
happening around you.
There is, however, a precautionary note on using soft law.
Waincymer considers how regimes relying on soft law can be over-
taken by those using so-called hard law:
In the early years of international environmental agreements,
some of these concerns may have been less important as they
did not seek to generate much in the way of clear rights and
obligations and were described by many as elements of "soft
law." The history of trade regulation has, on the other hand,
shown a desire to establish immediately binding rights and obli-
gations together with accountability standards, supported by a
reasonably unique and largely effective system of binding dis-
pute resolution.231
These differing styles may not only lead to conflict, but may favor
the vindication of trade rights over more amorphous environmen-
tal rights. Consequently, any increased use of soft law would
229. See, e.g., Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International
Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
230. On soft law generally, see COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BIND-
ING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); A Hard Look at
Soft Law, 82 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988).
231. Waincymer, supra note 141, at 15.
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require careful coordination so as not to inadvertently disadvan-
tage one area of international law at the gain of another.
B. From Conflicts to Coherence in the International Legal System
The combination of tools, rules, and techniques will assist policy-
makers in making the international legal system more efficient and
coherent. Perhaps most importantly, they will provide the means
to avoid many future conflicts. Treaty conflict and fragmentation
is, for the moment, a nascent problem that is increasingly present,
but not yet endemic. The concern is that not only will the number
of treaties continue to increase, but also that states will actually use
them and refer to them more often. In this manner, the success of
international legalization as a strategy can prefigure its own crisis.
As exemplified by the U.N.'s decision to organize a Study Group
on Fragmentation, the time to design solutions is now, before a
proliferation of such conflicts causes serious systemic stress.
Taken together, the procedures and rules suggested above lead
to four advantages over the current system. First, they would
increase certainty for decision makers that their agreements would
be honored, or at the very least, define their legal recourse if agree-
ments are not honored. Furthermore, emphasizing more compre-
hensive clauses of priority that are drafted to avoid conflicts with
the purposes-rather than merely the plain words-of other trea-
ties leads to better fine-tuning of how texts interact. Moreover, if
some ambiguity exists, the use of assurance as a standard proce-
dure encourages the parties to discuss their intentions. Assuming
that most states act in good faith most of the time, if a disagree-
ment becomes apparent, the parties may renegotiate. If a party
refuses to give an assurance, then it grants the other state the right
to terminate. If a party acts in bad faith and gives an assurance but
then breaches, the non-breaching state has the added evidentiary
weight of the assurance in any subsequent dispute resolution or
negotiation. Thus, while assurance is not a perfect solution, it at
least gives incentives for dialogue and provides a framework of
defaults that does not currently exist.
Second, the suggested rules and procedures allow for flexibility
without sacrificing normativity. In an AB:AC conflict, Article 30 of
the VCLT allows each treaty to remain effective between each of
the parties, leaving them to negotiate whatever solution they want.
One can view this as flexible to a fault, as there are no underlying
norms to guide the negotiations. The result may resemble the
E.U./Germany/U.S. government procurement dispute, where the
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"renegotiation" was essentially a trade skirmish. At a certain point,
flexibility gives way to inefficiency. While accepting that political
negotiations can in some instances be the best solution to a treaty
dispute, the use of background norms such as procedures for assur-
ance, tying good faith to treaty enforcement, and applying antici-
patory repudiation on an international level, gives the parties a
sense of which side has the stronger normative argument. This
does not, however, mean that the state with the stronger normative
argument would get all that it wants in political negotiations, as
neither state may in practice be willing to take the time and
expense to use third-party dispute resolution. Yet, at the very least
use of background norms gives all states a common normative per-
spective. Such a common perspective is noticeably lacking in many
intractable conflicts, such as that over Caspian Sea oil, where the
parties have very different views over which legal regime controls.
A third advantage of the suggested rules and procedures over
the current system is that these techniques and rules emphasize the
types of conflicts that policymakers are most concerned about-
when the conflict causes the purpose of the parties to one or more
treaties to be frustrated. By contrast, the current rules pertain pri-
marily to issues that are of little concern-whether the treaties are,
narrowly speaking, about the same subject.
Finally, for an international system to operate efficiently without
a single executive or any effective courts of general jurisdiction, it
must contain rules and procedures that the parties to a potential
dispute can apply themselves, without recourse to an international
tribunal. The jurisdictional problems of the San Juan River Case
and the current arguments over who should decide trade or envi-
ronment conflicts show that this is not a theoretical problem;
rather, it is at the heart of the matter.232 With problematic third-
party adjudication in the international realm, an added emphasis is
needed on the negotiation and drafting processes to avoid con-
flicts, as well as in designing rules that the parties themselves may
apply.
International law could become a more coherent system by hav-
ing less law, but better rules to interpret and resolve conflicts
232. The issue of jurisdictional conflicts is beyond the scope of this Article and has
been considered at length elsewhere. See, e.g., supra note 9; supra note 146. Absent the ICJ,
there are no international tribunals of general jurisdiction (and even in the case of the ICJ,
that is only technically true; query whether parties would want to bring complex trade law
problems to the ICJ, for example). This is in contrast to the realm of domestic law con-
flicts where one can access competent courts of general jurisdiction.
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between norms. Neither treaty congestion nor the existence of
treaty conflicts alone does violence to the idea that international
law is a system; rather, the damage is caused by the lack of consis-
tent and effective means of resolving such conflicts.
Legal regimes are used as a means to depoliticize international
relations. Yet, increasing the number and scope of regimes leads
to increasing treaty conflicts that can only be resolved through
political negotiations. In part, the increase in legal regimes
beyond a certain point makes state compliance with any particular
regime more difficult. Schachter notes that "[s] ome observers
have felt that the proliferation of numerous specialized treaties has
exceeded the absorptive capacity of many governments. '" 23 3 Rather
than increasing compliance, the sheer number of treaties under-
mines it. Schachter continues:
Some international lawyers, sensitive to the deluge of new trea-
ties and international legal decisions, have concluded that we
are getting too much law (just as many feel that in national soci-
ety we are getting too many laws). Sir Robert Jennings, [who
later became] a judge on the International Court, said in 1976
that "the danger today is that international law may be sub-
merged under the rival empires of paper emanating from
assemblies of government delegations.12 34
If a state absorbs two many legalistic regimes in a particular pol-
icy area, it may find itself having to negotiate with its various part-
ners as to its obligations and rights. After a point, therefore,
increased legalization paradoxically leads to increased politiciza-
tion if clear background rules do not contextualize the
negotiations.
Regardless of whether there are useful conflict avoidance clauses
or conflict resolution norms, an appreciation of the problems of
overlapping regulatory regimes and treaty conflicts leads to a cer-
tain skepticism concerning the wisdom of drafting broad treaties
that sacrifice strategy-long term viability and stability-for tac-
tics-a perception that something is being done about a problem.
If international lawyers wish to claim that international law func-
tions as a coherent system, they must treat it as such. Fostering the
habits and procedures that build coherence-from how clauses are
drafted to the underlying rules governing state practice with
respect to treaties-is of primary importance.
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CONCLUSION
Treaties set forth norms of expected behavior. The lack of a
principled method of treaty conflict resolution decreases the pre-
dictability of outcomes of actual and potential conflicts and conse-
quently debases the value of treaties. I have argued that there is no
single rule that will resolve the problem of treaty conflicts. Rather,
what is needed is a recognition that the current rules maintain a
level of uncertainty that is detrimental to the coherent functioning
of the international legal system.
There are two basic requirements for an effective response to
treaty conflicts: (1) default rules that give better predictability as to
which treaty would be enforceable in the case of conflict; and (2)
standard procedures for treaty negotiators and drafters to maxi-
mize the probability of avoiding conflicts.
Where parties are assessing a potential conflict, the international
system should recognize default rules such as: (1) refusing to give
assurance gives rise to a right of termination by the other party; (2)
good faith and clean hands are required for treaty enforcement;
and (3) in some cases, the later treaty may be an anticipatory repu-
diation of the earlier treaty, so parties must proceed at their own
risk.
Standard procedures of treaty drafting should make greater use
of: (1) purposive interpretation to spot conflicts that would frus-
trate the intent of the parties; (2) comprehensive clauses of prior-
ity; (3) coordination with other parties; and (4) use of
institutionalized safeguards.
Taken together, these tools and techniques do not constitute a
simple solution to the fragmentation caused by treaty conflicts. No
such simple solution exists. It is better, however, to focus on mini-
mizing the effects of a treaty conflict, rather than covering it over
with a formalistic solution that does not address the underlying
problems. 23 5
The solution to one dilemma patterns the next problem. The
success of treaties has led to the increased concern over regulatory
overlap, treaty conflicts, and the inadvertent hierarchization of sub-
stantive areas of international law. Over-construction has led to sys-
temic stress. This Article has suggested means to appreciate the
broader systemic implications of the lack of connection between
the norms of the VCLT and the actions of states. Through meth-
ods of treaty drafting that take into account the structure of the
235. SeeJenks, Law-Making Treaties, supra note 11, at 434.
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international legal system and through methods of treaty interpre-
tation that recognize how treaties in one policy area can affect trea-
ties in another, we can minimize-though never eliminate-the
scope of subsequent treaty conflicts.
